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The theme of this dissertation is Collateral. The first chapter focuses on the
meaning of collateral value. The main idea is that collateral value is the expected
liquidation price conditional on the borrower’s default, which is not necessarily
the distressed value of the underlying asset. The second chapter compares the
price movement of an asset before and after it has been used as collateral. A “V”
shaped price path is documented for the asset used as collateral, suggesting a
possible market instability.
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CHAPTER 1
AN ASSET PRICING AND BANK LENDING EQUILIBRIUM WITH
COLLATERAL
1.1 Introduction
Conventional asset pricing and corporate finance theories assume a partial equi-
librium lending market in which an agent or firm borrows against its own cred-
itworthiness. Specifically, many of them assume agents can lend to each other,
as in asset pricing literature, or the lending market is exogenously given and
lenders have no active role other than to answer borrowing requests, as in cor-
porate finance literature. In reality, neither of these is true. Banks perform the
majority of lending, while actively managing credit risk, especially a portfolio of
credit risk. The pursuant of managing the portfolio of credit risk raises serious
doubts about the assumption that creditworthiness only matters at the individ-
ual level, instead, banks’ portfolio view suggests that it should be determined
in the aggregate economy, in the same spirit as in Modern Portfolio Theory: the
risk comes from variance as well as covariance. Therefore, the lending market
assumed in a partial equilibrium model no longer applies to general equilib-
rium.
The major theories in capital asset pricing–the CAPM–as well as those in
corporate finance–the Modigliani and Miller theory, the pecking order theory
and the tradeoff theory–are all based on a partial equilibrium lending market.
Therefore, it may not be appropriate to apply them to explain the aggregate
economy or cross section variations. What we need is a new lending market
determined in general equilibrium, taking into consideration all the individuals’
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borrowing activities.
To achieve this, we model a lending market in which collateral plays an ex-
plicit role. Collateral is used to buffer against contractual defaults and thus is
able to shift the credit risk from the single borrower to the collateral value. De-
pending on whether the lender will liquidate collateral or hold it till maturity,
the collateral value can be determined by the liquidation price or the fundamen-
tals of the underlying asset. On many occasions, lenders carry a cost to maintain
collateral, such as in the mortgage industry, or they may fear a further loss, par-
ticularly in a crisis, so to liquidate collateral is a common action. The liquidation
price is not the unconditional expected selling price, but one conditional on the
borrower’s default. Therefore, the liquidation price reflects the covariance be-
tween the borrower’s wealth and the aggregate economy. As a result, collateral
value is not just a function of the asset, but also of the borrower. A simple hair-
cut defined as the ratio of collateral value to the market price is not able to fully
reflect this information.
Moreover, by including collateral, we can study the price impact of an asset
after its use as collateral. This is important because there is an increasing num-
ber of securities that can serve as collateral due to financial innovations. The
recent financial crisis in 2008 has also involved the use of collateral. Chapter 2
provides a solid study of this issue.
We construct a two-period economy with three entities–entrepreneurs, in-
vestors and banks–and two endowed assets–cash and a collateralizable asset.
Entrepreneurs are distinguished from investors by their private investments.
They have three ways to finance their private investments: endowed cash, pro-
2
ceeds from selling the endowed collateralizable asset to investors, or a loan from
a bank which requires this asset as collateral. In the case of borrower default,
the bank will liquidate collateral at a price dependent on all the potential buy-
ers’ cash holdings (see Oehmke 2008 for dynamically liquidating collateral). By
making the borrowing capacity equal to this liquidation price, the borrowing
activities for all agents are simultaneously determined in general equilibrium.
We call this an endogenous lending market, in contrast to the exogenous one
determined by the partial equilibrium in which no interaction exists among all
the borrowing activities.
This paper proves that this endogenous lending market is indeed different
from two commonly-used exogenous ones: the one with borrowing constraints
(restricted lending market) and the one without (unlimited lending market).
Two implications arise from this difference.
Firstly, in the endogenous lending market, the collateralizable asset price
is less sensitive to the change in returns on these private investments in the
endogenous lending market than in the restricted one; the reason is that the
substitution effect between the asset and private investments can be partially
offset by the wealth effect that exists only in the former market.
Secondly, in the endogenous lending market, banks facilitate diversification
among entrepreneurs’ choices of private investments. We demonstrate this by
giving them two private investment options with different profitabilities. In the
existing capital budgeting literature that assumes an exogenous lending mar-
ket, entrepreneurs always choose the more profitable one. In contrast, in the
endogenous lending market, they might choose the less profitable one in equi-
librium, due to subsidized loans from banks. Banks have incentives to offer
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such loans to avoid dealing with entrepreneurs making the same choice, as in
the idea of the Modern Portfolio Theory. In an extreme case, consider that the
less profitable investment has a return negatively correlated with the aggregate
economy. If an entrepreneur borrows to finance this investment, the bank can
either obtain a full repayment from the borrower or sell collateral when the ag-
gregate economy is doing well. In either case, the bank faces little risk. There-
fore, the loan could be attractive enough to the borrower to compensate for the
reduced profitability. In one sense, the loan from the bank subsidizes the less
profitable investment, or put it another way, leverage is essential to carry a less
profitable investment. This prediction is in line with the existing literature on
firms’ capital structure and profitability (Hail and Weiss 1967 and Gale 1972). In
contrast to the pecking order theory that only considers the firm’s perspective,
we provide a bank-firm joint analysis.
We also show that banks value collateral the least if they face a pool of identi-
cal entrepreneurs, in the same spirit as Shleifer and Vishny (1992). These authors
take a game theory approach to endogenize the collateral value. In contrast, we
emphasize the role of correlations among agents’ wealth in determining this
value.
Our model of collateral equilibrium has its root in a series of papers by
Geanakoplos, such as Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos (2003). Geanakop-
los (2003) emphasizes the role of collateral in leverage and asset price crashes,
whereas we focus on the role of collateral in forming an endogenous lending
market. Moreover, Geanakoplos (2003) attributes the higher price of an collater-
alizable asset to the excessive demand by the use of leverage, on the other hand,
we argue that it comes from the action of using the asset as collateral per se. As
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long as some entrepreneurs use the asset as collateral to borrow, the price will
be higher than in the situation where all entrepreneurs crowd the market to sell.
In other words, the action of using the asset as collateral is sufficient to cause
a higher price, regardless of the purpose. Therefore, we broaden the scope to
explain the higher price caused by this use of collateral.
Previous studies on bank lending and collateral have mainly explored issues
in partial equilibrium, such as asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders (Besanko and Thakor 1987; Bester 1987), and the quality of collateral
(Plaut, 1985). A key difference between studies in the partial and general equi-
librium lies in the valuation of collateral. In the case of partial equilibrium, the
collateral value is exogenously given. Whereas in the general equilibrium, the
collateral value is endogenously determined by all the agents.
Bank lending is related to credit constraints in macroeconomics. Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1997) have shown that cred-
its based on a borrower’s balance sheet may have a pro-cyclical effect on the
business cycle. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show how an exogenous shock to
the economy has ripple effects across time, further amplified by the use of col-
lateral. They all highlight the role of banks in exaggerating the business cycle
across time, but in the cross-sectional view, our model indicates that banks also
tend to attenuate variation by facilitating a diversified economy.
Lastly, this study is related to an extensive literature on banking. Most exist-
ing banking theories examine credit channels cross sectionally by focusing on
the mechanism through which banks acquire capital from savers and transfer it
to lenders. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Archaya,
Gorton and Metric (2009) and Gale and Yorulmazer (2010) study the risks when
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banks operate lending with short term funding. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) study
credit rationing in an asymmetric information environment. In this study, we
link the lending market to the future wealth of the aggregate economy via col-
lateral, and examine the role of the credit channel across time.
1.2 The Model
This section provides the model structure.
1.2.1 The Agents
We construct an economy consisting of two time periods 0 and 1, and a contin-
uum of agents, denoted by agent-i i ∈ [0, 1]. The risk free rate is r = 1. All the
results hold with a risk free rate greater than one, r > 1. At time 0, for i ∈ [0, 1],
agent-i is endowed with ei(0) units of a collateralizable asset x and ei(1) units of
cash, denoted by e˜i = (ei(0), ei(1)). x can only be traded at time 0 in a competi-
tive market where all agents are price takers. At time 1, x generates a bounded
positive random payoff x ∈ [xmin, xmax].
For a fraction of agents indexed by [0, δ], assume each also owns a private
investment available only to himself, denoted by yi for agent-i. Those agents are
called entrepreneurs. The others in (δ, 1] are called investors. If entrepreneur-i
spends cash c on private investment yi, he will obtain cyi at time 1 where yi ∈ R+
is a random return. All yis are independent of x and identically distributed with
a distribution function y˜. Consider two cases: all yis are independent and all
yis are identical. Denote by Φin = {yi|i ∈ [0, δ] and yis are independent.} and
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Φid = {yi|i ∈ [0, δ] and yis are identical.}
Assume all entrepreneurs are symmetric, meaning, they have the same util-
ity function and endowments, denoted by u and (e(0), e(1)), respectively. To
rule out corner solutions, assume investors have a sufficient amount of cash to
buy all x from entrepreneurs, that is,
Condition 1.2.1 (Sufficient Cash)
∫ 1
δ
ei(1)di > µx
∫ δ
0
ei(0)di,
where µx = Ex is the expected payoff of x.
All agents maximize the expected utility of their final wealth at time 1. To
uniform notations, define yi = 0 for investors i ∈ (δ, 1]. Denote by ui agent-i’s
utility function satisfying
(i) u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0,
(ii) u′′ is continuous.
At time 0, agent-i chooses a wealth portfolio wi = (ai, bi, ci) to maximize
Eui(aix + bi + ciyi) (1.1)
subject to
(i) aip + bi + ci = ei(0)p + ei(1),
(ii) ai ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0,
where ai is the asset x position, bi is the cash position, ci is the security yi position
and p is the market price of x. Short sale of asset x is not allowed, for short
sale is a lability to short sellers and such liability cannot be enforced in a weak
enforcement environment. The optimal demand function for x is denoted by
a¯i. a¯i is a function of the endowments (ei(0), ei(1)) and the price p. Write a¯i as
a¯i(p, ei(0), ei(1)).
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For investors, assume as a group they are willing to hold all x if the price p
is small enough:
lim
p→0
∫ 1
δ
a¯i(p, ei(0), ei(1))di >
∫ 1
0
ei(0)di. (1.2)
The definition of the market equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 1 (Market Equilibrium) At time 0, the market for x is in equilibrium if
the following conditions are satisfied:
(1)Both entrepreneurs and investors maximize their utilities;
(2)The market for x clears.
Because entrepreneurs are symmetric, they have the same optimal demand
function for x and invest the same cash in security yis.
The primary idea of this study is to compare the different means for en-
trepreneurs to raise cash for their private investments: selling asset x or use
it as collateral to borrow. If both entrepreneurs and investors start with sub-
optimal wealth portfolios, they may still want to trade in the market just to
rebalance their portfolios, even without any private investment. To focus on
the entrepreneurs’ trading incentives for raising cash for their private invest-
ments, the following starting equilibrium condition is imposed. The condition
stipulates that there is no need for all the agents to trade in the market, if en-
trepreneurs have no private investments.
Condition 1.2.2 (Starting Equilibrium) Without private investment yis, all the
agents are in equilibrium with their endowments. In other words, there exists a price p∗
such that, for i ∈ [0, 1], agent-i’s endowments (ei(0), ei(1)) maximize
Eui(ax + b) (1.3)
8
subject to
(i) ap∗ + b = ei(0)p∗ + ei(1),
(ii) a ≥ 0, and b ≥ 0.
The next condition is to make sure the trades flow one direction: it’s the
entrepreneurs that sell asset x. Now, entrepreneurs have to compare whether to
sell x or use x as collateral to borrow.
Condition 1.2.3 (Capital Competing) Entrepreneurs demand less x after they have
yis, that is, for all i ∈ [0, δ],
a∗i (p, ei(0), ei(1)) > a¯i(p, ei(0), ei(1)), (1.4)
where a∗i is the optimal holding of x for entrepreneur-i in condition 2.2.1. In a sense,
the private investment yis compete with x for capital.
1.2.2 The Banks
Assume banks have perfect information on each agent. Banks only offer a dis-
count loan. This discount loan is one on which the interest is deducted from
the face amount when the loan is offered. The borrower only receives the prin-
cipal after the interest is deducted but must repay the full amount of the loan.
Assume R is the interest rate charged by banks. Further assume that the loan
is nonrecourse and the law to enforce repayment is weak. Therefore collateral
is the only instrument for banks to protect against loan losses. To be specific,
when a borrower defaults, the bank can only seize the collateral, but has no
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right to claim the borrower’s wealth beyond that. Therefore, the value of collat-
eral has to be large enough to fully cover loan losses. If the loan principle is l,
the value of collateral has to be greater than or equal to l. Assume there are a
sufficient number of banks in the competitive lending business and each is en-
dowed with sufficient cash as capital. Competition implies that banks demand
collateral worth the same as the loan principle. Moreover, given that the loan
losses have been fully covered by collateral, banks must earn zero profits on the
repayment, charging the risk free rate for the loan, that is, R = r = 1.
After banks seize the collateral, assume they will liquidate it immediately,
instead of holing it till maturity. There are two major reasons for banks to do
so: maintenance costs and further deterioration of the collateral value. The re-
payment date must be before the payoff of x. In addition, this timing makes
it impossible for all agents to finance the purchasing of x; this confines the use
of borrowed cash solely on yi, for i ∈ [0, δ], and makes entrepreneurs the only
borrowers.
At time 0, entrepreneurs use x as collateral to borrow from banks, and repay
loans at time 1 between the realization of y and x. The sequence of time 1 events
is illustrated in figure 1.1.
	

	



Figure 1.1: The sequence of the three events at time 1
The lending policy is summarized as the following rule.
Rule 1.2.1 (Lending Policy) For a loan with principle l, banks require the same value
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l of asset x as collateral and charge a risk free rate R = 1. This is equivalent to assuming
that banks have zero Value at Risk in a competitive lending business.
Since it does not matter which bank an entrepreneur borrows from, we can
view all the banks together as one aggregate bank, or the bank. It is sufficient
to study the behavior of this bank that operates according to the lending policy
described in rule 1.2.1.
A. Entrepreneurs’ optimal borrowing
When the bank calculates the collateral value, it needs to estimate the total
quantity of collateral to be liquidated in the market at time 1 when borrowers
default. Therefore the bank has to study the borrowers’ repayment behavior. To
keep the model simple, assume there is no renegotiation between entrepreneurs
and the bank once entrepreneurs default on the loan. Entrepreneurs can choose
to either repay or default on the entire loan. All the result in this section hold if
the model is extended to a simple type of renegotiation: partial repayment1.
Denote by v(β) the collateral value for β units of asset x calculated by the
bank, for β ∈ [0, 1]. For entrepreneur-i ∈ [0, δ], assume he uses βi units of x as
collateral to borrow βiv(βi) at time 0. Assume he has also used endowed cash
e(1)− bi for yi. At time 1 after the payoff of yi, he decides whether to repay the
loan, that is, he chooses 1Fi to maximize
Eui((ei(0)− βi)x + (e(1)− bi + βiv(βi))yi + bi + 1Fi(βix− βiv(βi))) (1.5)
1The partial repayment rule is:
Rule 1.2.2 (Partial Repayment Rule) When repaying the loan, entrepreneurs can repay a fraction of
it to redeem the collateral at the same ratio, that is, repay κl to redeem κβ units of x, where κ ∈ [0, 1].
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subject to
(i) 1Fi ∈ {0, 1}, and
(ii) (e(1)− bi + βiv(βi))yi + bi − 1Fiβiv(βi) ≥ 0.
1Fi = 1 means entrepreneur-i repays the loan fully and 1Fi = 0 means he defaults
on the loan completely. 1Fi is a function of yi, written as 1Fi(yi). By symmetry,
in equilibrium, all borrowers hold the same portfolio at time 0 and hence have
the same repayment function. The subscript “i” in 1Fi can be dropped. Rewrite
it as 1F (yi). Denote by D = {d|1F (d) = 0} the set of returns for y causing the
borrowers to default. In other words, the bank is to liquidate collateral when
the borrowers have returns from yis in the set D. Without further regulations
on the entrepreneurs’ utility function u, it may always be optimal for them to
default on the loan. Two conditions regarding the positive wealth effect and
the downward sloping demand curve are required to discipline entrepreneurs’
repayment behaviors. Entrepreneurs’ willingness to repay the loan is consistent
with that in a repeated borrowing environment in which their reputation of
repaying the loan is considered by a bank as an significant factor.
Condition 1.2.4 (Positive Wealth Effect) For the demand function a∗i in condition
2.2.1,
∂a∗i
∂ei(1)
≥ 0 (1.6)
holds for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Condition 1.2.5 (Downward Sloping Demand Curves) The demand function a∗i
in condition 2.2.1 is a decreasing function of price p, ∂a
∗
i
∂p
≤ 0, for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Given these conditions, the entrepreneurs’ repayment strategy is summa-
rized as a proposition.
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Proposition 1 (Optimal Repayment) There exists a critical point y∗ such that an
entrepreneur is willing to repay the loan if y ≥ y∗ and default completely if y < y∗,
and another y∗∗ such that he has the ability to repay the loan if y ≥ y∗∗. To sum up,
D = [ymin, y
∗ ∨ y∗∗).
Proof. Denote by β and c the amount of asset x an entrepreneur uses as collateral
to borrow and hold in cash, respectively. Given two returns y2 > y1, it suffices
to show that if the entrepreneur is willing to repay fully the loan with return
y1, he must be willing to do so with return y2. Denote by ui = Eu(e(0)x +
(e(1)− c + βv(β))yi − βv(β)). With return y2, the ability to repay the loan is not
an issue for he has more cash. Denote by A(u, a) the minimal amount of cash
together with a units of x to generate the utility u. Since the entrepreneur is
willing to repay the loan with return y1, it immediately follows that A(u1, e(0)−
β) − A(u1, e(0)) > βv(β). It’s sufficient to show A(u2, e(0) − β) − A(u2, e(0)) >
A(u1, e(0) − β) − A(u1, e(0)). Denote by P (a, b) a price function such that the
entrepreneur optimally holds a units of x and b units of cash. According to the
first order condition ∂A(u,a)
∂a
= −P (a, A(u, a)),
∫ e(0)
e(0)−β
P (a, A(u1, a))da = A(u1, e(0)− β)− A(u1, e(0)) > βv(β) (1.7)
If p(a, A(u2, a)) > P (a, A(u1, a)) holds, then it’s true that the en-
trepreneurs are willing to repay the loan with return y2, according to
equation (1.7). From A(u2, a) > A(u1, a) and condition 2.2.5, it must
be a = a∗(P (a, A(u2, a)), a, A(u2, a)) > a∗(P (a, A(u2, a)), a, A(u1, a)). Since
a∗(P (a, A(u1, a)), a, A(u1, a)) = a, it must follow P (a, A(u1, a)) < P (a, A(u2, a))
from condition 2.2.2.
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After solving 1F (yi), the entrepreneur-i at time 0 chooses a wealth portfolio
(βi, bi) to maximize
Eu((e(0)− βi)x + (e(1)− bi + βiv(βi))yi + bi + 1F (yi)(βix− βiv(βi))) (1.8)
subject to
(i) 0 ≤ βi ≤ e(0) and
(ii) 0 ≤ bi ≤ e(1).
B. The bank’s collateral valuation
This bank assesses the collateral, not by its fundamental value, but by market
value. Fundamental value is the utility obtained from consuming or holding the
asset. The market value is how much one receives when selling it in the market.
The bank can only seize and liquidate collateral when their borrowers default
at time 1. Since the market is closed at time 1, the bank sells x to all the agents
over the counter. In fact, it quotes an asking price for them to purchase.
The way for the bank to compute the collateral value is ”guess and verify
later”. The bank guesses in equilibrium, entrepreneurs in [0, δm] transact in
the market, and those in (δm, δ] borrow with collateral, in which 0 ≤ δm ≤ δ.
In the market, according to the symmetric maximization problem (1.1), each
entrepreneur in equilibrium has the same wealth portfolio, denoted by wδm =
(aδm , bδm , cδm) as a function of δm. The equilibrium price and investor-i’s wealth
portfolio are denoted by pδm and wiδm = (aiδm , biδm , ciδm), respectively. It can be
seen that, in equilibrium, the wealth portfolios for all agents in [0, δm]
⋃
(δ, 1] are
solely determined by the variable δm.
Entrepreneurs in (δm, δ] choose to borrow from the bank. By symmetry, in
equilibrium, they use the same quantity of x as collateral to borrow the same
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amount of cash from the bank. Assume each uses β units of collateral and the
collateral value computed by the bank is v(β). The valuation depends on the
correlations among yis. The difference can be seen from the following two spe-
cial cases.
Case 1: all yis are independent
Because there are a continuum of entrepreneurs in (δm, δ], the measure of
defaulting entrepreneurs is exactly (δ − δm) Pr(y˜ ∈ D). At time 1, there’ll be
exactly (δ − δm)β Pr(y˜ ∈ D) units of x to be liquidated by the bank. The
wealth portfolios for all borrowers are functions of δm and v(β). In the mar-
ket, the equilibrium portfolios for all market participants are functions of δm.
Define a set including all agents’ wealth information at time 1, ~(δm, β, v(β)) =
~[0,δm]
⋃
~(δm,δ]
⋃
~(δ,1] where ~[0,δm], ~(δm,δ] and ~(δ,1] are the wealth information
sets for the entrepreneurs in the market, the entrepreneurs with the bank and
the investors, respectively. They are
~[0,δm) = {w1i = (aδm , ((e(0)− aδm)pδm + e(1)− cδm)yi + cδm)|i ∈ [0, δm)},
~(δm,δ] = {w1i = (e(0)− β + β1F (yi), (e(1)− bi + βv(β))yi
+bi − βv(β)1F (yi))|i ∈ (δm, δ]} and
~(δ,1] = {w1i = (aiδm , biδm)|i ∈ (δ, 1]}.
Seen from the continuum of entrepreneurs, both ~[0,δm) and ~(δm,δ] do not vary
with the random returns yis and thus are fixed. The wealth sets for agents in
the market, ~[0,δm] and ~(δ,1], are determined solely by δm while the set ~(δm,δ] is
determined by both v(β) and δm.
With the wealth information set ~ for all agents, the demand function for x
can be derived. The market is closed at time 1, so the bank sells the collateral
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by quoting an ask price. Observing the price, all agents can decide how much
to buy, but cannot sell. Specifically, assume an agent with wealth portfolio w1 =
(a1, b1) observes the ask price p, where a1 is x position and b1 cash position. The
agent maximizes
Eu(ax + b) (1.9)
subject to
(i) ap + b = a1p + b1, and
(ii) a ≥ a1.
The second constraint requires the agent to purchase only x. The optimal
demand for x is denoted by a′(p). This agent then buys from the bank
max(0, a′(p) − a1) units of x at the quoted price p. Denote such a demand by
Di(w1i, p) for agent-i where w1i is agent-i’s wealth portfolio at time 1. The ag-
gregated purchase from all agents is D(~, p) =
∫ 1
0
Di(w1i, p). The collateral value
v(β) solves
D(~, v(β)) = (δ − δm)β Pr(y˜ ∈ D). (1.10)
The existence of v(β) is guaranteed by the continuity of equation (1.10). The
right hand is a constant number. For the left hand, if v(β) is sufficiently small,
the total purchasing from investors alone could exceed the right hand side ac-
cording to equation (1.2). As v(β) approaches xmax, the total purchasing ap-
proaches zero. So, there must exist a solution for v(β).
If there are several solutions for v(β), in equilibrium, only the one with
the highest value will be favored by borrowers. Driven by competition, the
bank offers the highest value possible for v(β) in equilibrium. Rewrite v(β)
as vδm(β, Φin), emphasizing it’s a function of δm and Φin, the fraction of en-
trepreneurs in the market and the private investment returns, respectively.
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Case 2: all yi are identical
Now if a borrower defaults, all borrowers default because they hold the
same portfolio at time 0 and obtain the same return from securities yis. The
zero Value-at-Risk constraint stipulates that the bank evaluates the collateral in
the worst scenario, that is, all yis generate the lowest return in D, denoted by
ymin. The amount of collateral to be liquidated by the bank is (δ − δm)β. The
set of wealth information ~ is the same as before except now yi = ymin for all
entrepreneurs. As before, write v(β) as vδm(β, Φid). It immediately follows that
vδm(β, Φin) > vδm(β, Φid), for there is more collateral to be liquidated when the
aggregate economy has minimum wealth.
Proposition 2 (Collateral Value Comparison) Given 0 ≤ δm ≤ δ and 0 ≤ β ≤
e(0), it always holds that vδm(β, Φin) > vδm(β, Φid). The collateral value is higher in a
diversified economy in which entrepreneurs have independent private investments.
1.2.3 Summary
As the collateral value is determined by the wealth of the aggregate economy
conditional on borrowers’ default, the correlation among the wealth of agents is
an important factor. As shown in the proposition, the collateral value tends to
be higher in a diversified economy.
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1.2.4 The Bank and Market Equilibrium
Now consider an economy with both the bank and a market. To finance yi,
entrepreneur-i has two choices: to sell x in the market or to use x as collateral
to borrow from the bank. In a competitive market, he is only allowed to submit
the demand curve to the Walrasian auctioneer who then determines the price.
With this price, the entrepreneur learns the utility obtained in the market. On
the other hand, the bank announces the loan terms at the beginning, namely,
the collateral value function v(β). Observing v(β), the entrepreneur is able to
compute the maximum utility he can achieve before actually borrowing from
the bank.
There is no mechanism for an entrepreneur to make decisions by taking into
consideration both the market and the bank at the same time, considering he
does not know the exact amount of utilities he can obtain from the market. It
is natural to think of his decision as a sequence. He first computes the max-
imum utility from the bank. This utility is his reservation utility for his next
step to participate in the market. For a given price in the market, he can com-
pute this utility. If this utility is greater than the reservation utility, he will sub-
mit the quantity together with the price to the auctioneer; otherwise, he will
not reveal his demand to the auctioneer at that particular price. Therefore, for
entrepreneurs, the auctioneer may only have partial demand curves. But for
investors, they submit the normal continuous demand curves, for they do not
have any reservation utility to participate in the market. The example of a par-
tially revealing demand can be seen in figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: An example of demands for investors and entrepreneurs
By symmetry, all entrepreneurs have the same reservation utility from bor-
rowing, denoted by pib; they must submit the same demand to the auctioneer.
In maximization problem (1.1). Denote by P (pib) the set of prices where en-
trepreneurs obtain a higher utility than pib, that is,
P (pib) = {p|Eu(a¯(p, e(0), e(1))x + e(1) + e(0)p− a¯(p, e(0), e(1))p) ≥ pib}. (1.11)
Entrepreneurs submit to the auctioneer demands {(p, a¯(p, e(0), e(1)))|p ∈
P (pib)}.
Because not all demands are continuous, the auctioneer may not be able to
clear the market for all entrepreneurs and investors. According to condition
2.2.3, entrepreneurs should be sellers of x in equilibrium. If entrepreneurs ob-
tain a utility higher than pib for price p1 ∈ P (pib), the prices are higher than p1,
because for the higher price, they can sell less x to raise the same amount of
cash in y. Define p(pib) such that p(pib) = inf P (pib), namely, entrepreneurs prefer
to sell the asset in the market for prices greater than or equal to p(pib).
Revisit the market with entrepreneurs in [0, δm] and all investors in (δ, 1],
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as guessed by the bank in the previous section. If the equilibrium price pδm is
greater than or equal to p(pib), the equilibrium will not be affected by the fraction
of demands submitted by those entrepreneurs.
For those δm such that pδm ≥ p(pib), the auctioneer is able to clear the market
for entrepreneurs [0, δm] and investors (δ, 1]. Since there are more than one ways
to clear the market, the auctioneer is required to clear the market for as many
entrepreneurs as possible. Specifically, the auctioneer clears the market for all
investors and entrepreneurs [0, δm] where δm satisfies pδm = p(pib). If such pδm
does not exist, then δm = 0 or δm = δ, depending on whether p(pib) > p0 or
p(pib) < pδ.
The mechanism is summarized as follows.
1. The bank announces the loan terms, specifically the collateral value func-
tion v(β). Entrepreneurs calculate the optimal borrowing and its associ-
ated utility;
2. Entrepreneurs and investors submit to the Walrasian auctioneer the part
of their demands which generates more utility than from borrowing as in
the previous step;
3. The auctioneer sets a price to clear the market for as many entrepreneurs
as possible;
4. Entrepreneurs whose demands are not accepted in the market will borrow
from the bank.
The following flowchart summarizes the sequence of actions for en-
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trepreneurs at time 0.
Calculate the optimal borrowing from the bank =⇒ Submit demands in the market
=⇒


Transact in the market if demands are cleared
Borrow from the bank if demands are not cleared
The equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Bank and Market Equilibrium) At time 0, the market is in equilib-
rium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1)Banks fully protect the loan loss by requiring sufficient collateral;
(2)All agents make optimal decisions;
(3)The market clears for x.
Proposition 3 (Nonempty Borrowing Equilibrium) Given Φin, in the time 0
bank and market equilibrium, the measure of entrepreneurs borrowing from the bank
is positive, that is, δm < δ.
Proof. Denote by piδm the utility for an entrepreneur in the market with en-
trepreneurs in [0, δm] and investors in (δm, δ]. And denote by pibδm the maximum
utility for a borrower when the bank offers a loan with collateral value function
vδm(β, y˜) based on the guess that entrepreneurs [0, δm] transact in the market. In
equilibrium, it must be pibδm = piδm .
We claim that piδm is a decreasing function of δm. As there are more en-
trepreneurs in the market, each sells the same quantity of x for less price and
hence receives a lower utility.
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Consider δm = 0. If pib0 ≥ pi0, all entrepreneurs are optimal to borrow from
the bank, and the proposition follows. Assume otherwise pib0 < pi0.
Now we compare the two utilities at δm = δ and prove that pibδ ≥ piδ. Assume
otherwise pibδ < piδ and it’s an equilibrium for the market with all entrepreneurs.
Consider a small fraction of entrepreneurs (δ − , δ] who now switch to borrow
from the bank using aδ units of x as collateral, the same quantity sold in the
market. The value of the collateral vδ(aδ) is the price the bank receives when
selling aδ Pr(D) units of x in the market. According to the mechanism, the
bank will quote an asking price. For entrepreneurs in the market who obtain a
return greater than 1, they are willing to buy e(0)−aδ− units of x at price p∗. As
long as  is small enough so that (e(0) − aδ−)(δ − ) Pr(y ≥ 1) ≥ aδ Pr(D), the
bank can sell the collateral for at least p∗. Therefore, the borrowers can obtain
a larger sum of cash by using aδ units of x as collateral. Since using aδ units of
x as collateral to borrow is not necessarily the best strategy for entrepreneurs
(δ − , δ], they can achieve even higher utility using the banks. Thus it won’t
be an equilibrium for the market with all entrepreneurs. It immediately follows
pibδ > piδ.
Now that both pib0 < pi0 and pibδ > piδ hold, there must exist at least one δm
such that pibδm = piδm from continuity. Denote by ∆ = {δm|pibδm = piδm} a set
consisting of all such δm. By continuity again, ∆ is a closed set. Then there’s
only one equilibrium with δ∗m = min ∆ that generates the highest utility among
all ∆, for a bank can always offer such a loan with collateral value function
vδ∗m(β) to attract all the potential borrowers. The proof is complete.
This proposition distinguishes the endogenous lending market from the re-
stricted one, for borrowing activities do exist in equilibrium for the former.
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If some of the entrepreneurs leave the market to borrow from the bank, there
will be less trading in the market with investors. The collateralizable asset price
is under less pressure from the selling. As a result, the price can be higher when
the asset can be used as collateral, in line with the prediction by Geanakoplos
(2003).
Corollary 1 (Collateralizable Asset Price) The price of an asset is higher when it
can be used as collateral.
1.3 Implications for Asset Returns
Mayers (1972) and (1973) has extended the Capital Market Pricing Model by
including a nonmarketable asset for each agent in the economy. He focuses on
how the expected returns of the marketable assets are affected by their corre-
lations with nonmarketable assets. He has derived an asset pricing model in a
linear form similar to the CAPM. Both the CAPM and Mayers’ extended model
assume an exogenous lending market. In this section, by assuming indepen-
dent correlation between the marketable and nonmarketable assets, we revisit
the asset pricing model by endogenizing the lending market. Specifically, we
link the lending market directly to the profitability of the private investment.
The private investment is very similar to the nonmarketable assets in Mayers’
model, except that his nonmarketable assets pay a lump sum of money while
the private investment is a production technology requiring input of cash in
the beginning. Further assume all entrepreneurs possess the identical private
investment. The goal here is to make bank lending less attractive so that the en-
dogenous lending market can be distinguished from the unlimited one in which
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there’s no borrowing constraints. The identical private investment represents
high systematic risk, suggesting these entrepreneurs are in the same industry or
in the same region.
To be in line with the CAPM, assume both entrepreneurs and investors have
mean-variance utility functions. The conventional CAPM considers two exoge-
nous lending markets: agents can either borrow without constraints (unlimited
lending market) or cannot borrow at all (restricted lending market). With the en-
dogenous lending market, there are three patterns of the relationship between
the expected returns of the collateralizable asset and the private investment. In
the mean-variance economy with exogenous lending markets, only the mean
and variance play a role. For the endogenous lending market, the probability
distribution of the private investment also matters, especially the value of min-
imum return, because a zero VaR stipulates that the bank considers the worst
scenario. To demonstrate the difference among the three patterns, we construct
a series of private investments with the same variance and increasing means
from zero to infinity.
The difficulty is to show the difference between the endogenous and unlim-
ited lending market. In the mean-variance economy, the collateralizable asset
price is not affected by the variation of the private investments in the unlimited
lending market. In the endogenous lending market, if bank lending is always
a better way to finance than asset sale, there will be no asset sale or no trading
in the market, leading to a price as if there is no private investment, the same
result as the unlimited lending market. To demonstrate the difference, we show
that asset sale does exist in certain equilibrium by using a particular form of the
probability distribution for the series of private investments. With proposition
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3, we show the existence of both bank lending and asset sale, distinguishing the
endogenous bank lending model from the conventional exogenous restricted
and unlimited lending markets.
Firstly, we derive an asset pricing model with an exogenous lending market.
Secondly, we endogenize the lending market and compare the difference.
1.3.1 Exogenous Bank Lending
Assume all agents have the same mean-variance utility function with risk toler-
ance γ. In addition, assume they are all endowed with the same quantity of x,
ei(0) = 1 for i ∈ [0, 1]. Denote by ys the series of identical private investments
for entrepreneurs, s ∈ [−(2q − 1)t,∞) in which q is arbitrarily close to one and t
satisfies the following condition:
Condition 1.3.1 δ
1−δ
(t− 1) > 1.
For s ∈ [0,∞), let ys be a binomial random variable such that
(i) ys(ω1) = s and ys(ω2) = s + t, and
(ii) Pr(ω2) = q > 12 .
And for s ∈ [−(2q − 1)t, 0), let
(I) ys(ω1) = 2qt− s and ys(ω2) = (2q − 1)t + s.
All the private investments ys have the same variance q(1 − q)t2 and an in-
creasing mean from (1 − q)t to ∞. The goal is to prove for private investment
y0, some entrepreneurs finance the private investment y0 by selling asset x in
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equilibrium.
For private investments, denote µy(s) = Eys and σ2y = var(ys) where the
variance is constant and does not change with s. In addition, denote µx = Ex
and σ2x = var(x) for the collateralizable asset x. To highlight the role of using
asset x solely to finance, assume entrepreneurs have no cash, e(1) = 0. The
results in this section can be relaxed with a positive amount of endowed cash.
For entrepreneurs in [0, δ], they maximize
E(aix + bi + ciys)−
1
γ
var(aix + bi + ciys) (1.12)
subject to
(i) aip + bi + ci = ei(0)p
(ii) ai ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0,
where ai is the x position, bi is the cash position, ci is the ys position and p is
the market price of x. In the unlimited lending market, the cash holding bi can
be either positive or negative, namely, there’s no restriction. In the restricted
lending market, the cash holding b ≥ 0. For investors in (δ, 1], they maximize
the same objective function (1.12) without ys.
The goal is to find the relationship between µx
p
and µy(s), the expected re-
turns of x and ys, respectively.
A. The unlimited Lending Market
The price for x satisfies the first order condition
µx −
2σ2x
γ
p
= 1. (1.13)
The expected return for asset x, µx
p
, is a constant number, regardless of the
change in µy(s). The relation between the two expected returns µxp and µy(s)
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is shown in figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: The relationship between the expected returns of x and y in an
exogenous lending market
B. The Restricted Lending Market
Now consider an economy without lending. In order to raise more cash for
private investment ys, entrepreneurs have to sell x. The endowment arrange-
ment satisfies the starting equilibrium condition 2.2.1 with price p∗ = µx −
2σ2x
γ
.
Additional conditions are needed to satisfy the mean-variance utility prefer-
ence. Since asset x generates a positive payoff, all agents prefer more to less, at
least in the range of [0, 1]. This requirement gives the following condition.
Condition 1.3.2
γµx
2σ2x
≥ 1 for all i ∈ [0, 1] (1.14)
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In equilibrium, the market price p is determined by the investors’ optimal
holding of asset x
a¯i =
γ(µx − p)
2σ2x
, i ∈ (δ, 1]. (1.15)
Denote by a¯i the optimal holding of asset x for entrepreneurs in [0, δ]. By sym-
metry, each entrepreneur in equilibrium holds the same quantity of x and in-
vests the same amount of cash in ys. If the investment in ys is nonzero, the
entrepreneur must have sold some x to investors to raise the needed cash, and
hence holds less x than investors do. The marginal utility of holding x for en-
trepreneurs in i ∈ [0, δ) is µx −
2a¯iσ2x
γ
, which is greater than µx −
2a¯jσ
2
x
γ
= 1 for
investors in j ∈ (δ, 1] due to a¯i < a¯j. Therefore, it’s optimal for entrepreneurs to
hold no cash. For them, the marginal utility of x and ys must be the same
1
p
(µx −
2a¯i
γ
σ2x) = µy(s)−
2c¯i
γ
σ2y . (1.16)
Solving it, this equation yields the optimal holdings of x
a¯i =
2
γ
σ2yp + µx − pµy(s)
2
γ
(σ2x + pσ
2
y)
, i ∈ [0, δ]. (1.17)
Given price p, a¯i is seen to be a decreasing function of µy(s). But the equilib-
rium price p of asset x is also a function of µy(s). To consider the full effect of
µy(s) on the asset’s optimal holding a¯i, take the derivative of a¯i with respect to
p to obtain
2
γ
σ2xσ
2
y−µyσ
2
x−µxσ
2
x
( 2
γ
(σ2x+pσ
2
y))
2 , which is less than zero according to equation (1.14).
For entrepreneurs, a¯i is therefore a decreasing function of both p and µy. Seen
from equation (1.15), the investors’ optimal holding of asset x, a¯i, is a decreas-
ing function of p. It follows that the equilibrium price p is a decreasing function
of µy(s). Otherwise, the optimal holdings of x for all the agents a¯ decrease as
µy(s) increases and the market cannot clear. The relationship between the two
expected returns of x and y is shown in figure 1.4.
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Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the price of asset x is a decreasing function of µy, the
expected return of asset y.
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Figure 1.4: The relationship between the expected returns of x and y in an
exogenous lending market
1.3.2 Endogenous Bank Lending
Intuitively, when µy(s) is low, the expected return from x should also be low,
for entrepreneurs have little incentive to sell x in exchange for cash to invest in
ys. On the other hand, as µ(s) increases, entrepreneurs become willing to sell
more x to raise cash, which could potentially push down the price. Meanwhile,
the loan from the bank becomes increasingly attractive as the collateral value
appreciates with the increasing return of ys. As a result, more entrepreneurs
leave the market for the bank. Under less selling pressures, the market price
of x remains high, causing a low expected return. To sum up, the price of x
is the same as in equation (1.13) when µy(s) is extremely low or high, that is,
when s = −(2q − 1)t or s > 1, respectively. The remaining riddle is for the
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values of µy(s) in the middle range. In the rest of this section, we show that
the price of asset x is indeed lower than equation (1.13) for private ivestment y0,
distinguishing the endogenous lending market from the unlimited one.
Now assume βv(β) is an increasing function of β for any collateral value
function v. Borrowers fail to repay the loan only when ω1 happens, that is,
y0(ω1) = 0. In this scenario, no entrepreneurs own any cash after suffering a bad
return on the private investment. The bank has to liquidate the collateral, and
hence the liquidation price is µx− δβ+1−δ1−δ
2σ2x
γ
for an amount of βδ units of x to be
liquidated. Take the derivative of βv(β) = β(µx − δβ+1−δ1−δ
2σ2x
γ
) with respect to β
and let it be greater than zero to obtain the following condition.
Condition 1.3.3 (Monotonicity) p∗ − 4δσ
2
x
(1−δ)γ
> 0.
Under condition 1.3.3 and 1.3.1, the participants in the market will be
nonempty.
Proposition 5 (Nonempty Market) For private investment y0, some entrepreneurs
trade in the market in equilibrium for a certain value of the probability q.
Proof. Assume all entrepreneurs prefer to borrow from the bank. Denote by
β the quantity of x in equilibrium used as collateral to borrow. Since all en-
trepreneurs default at the same time, the collateral value v(β) = µx − βδ+1−δ1−δ
2σ2
γ
is the price when the bank sells βδ units of x to the investors. Denote by Ub
the utility for the entrepreneurs borrowing from the bank. It’s important to
note that the collateral value v(β) does not change as the probability of ob-
taining good return q increases, as long as q < 1. Therefore it follows that
limq→1− Ub = µx + βv(β)(t− 1)−
σ2x
γ
≤ µx + v(1)(t− 1)−
σ2x
γ
.
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If a very small fraction of entrepreneurs [0, 1] switch to transact in the
market, the market equilibrium price p1 satisfies lim1→0 = p∗. Denote
by Um(1) the utility for the entrepreneurs in the market. Then it follows
limq→1− lim1→0 Um(1) ≥ aµx + (1 − a)p
∗t − a
2σ2x
γ
, for any a ∈ [0, 1]. Particularly,
let a = 0 and obtain limq→1− lim1→0 Um(1) ≥ p∗t.
According to condition 1.3.1, it holds that p∗t > µx+v(1)(t−1)−
σ2x
γ
. Therefore
by continuity, for a q arbitrarily close to 1, it’s optimal for a small fraction of
entrepreneurs to transact in the market.
Corollary 2 From both propositions 5 and 3, the endogenous lending market is in-
deed different from the two commonly used exogenous lending markets: the restricted
and unlimited lending markets. For a certain return y of the private project, in the
endogenous lending market, ex ante homogeneous entrepreneurs choose different opti-
mal strategies, whereas in the two endogenous lending markets, they choose the same
optimal one.
For such a series of private investments ys in the proposition, the relationship
between the expected returns of x and ys is shown in figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: The relationship between the expected returns of x and y in an
endogenous lending market
1.3.3 Summary
The private investments have both the substitution and wealth effects on the col-
lateralizable asset’s return, because on the one hand, they compete with the col-
lateralizable assets for the entrepreneurs’ limited wealth, and on the other hand,
they define the entrepreneurs’ borrowing limits. According to the starting equi-
librium condition, both entrepreneurs and investors already hold the optimal
wealth portfolios without the private investments. The price of the collateraliz-
able asset declines only when entrepreneurs sell it to investors in order to raise
cash. The more profitable the private investments, the more entrepreneurs want
to sell the collateralizable asset in order to invest. This is known as the substi-
tution effect. The wealth effect derives from the way the endogenous lending
market works. The borrowing capacity for entrepreneurs is the collateralizable
asset’s value used as collateral, that is, the value in the future after entrepreneurs
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receive the payoff from their private investments. As these private investments
become more profitable, entrepreneurs’ wealth increases. This increased wealth
bids up the collateral value and hence the borrowing capacity. This in turn re-
duces the need to raise cash by selling the collateralizable asset. As a result, the
price of the collateralizable asset remains the same as when there is no private
investment.
1.4 Banks Facilitate Diversification
So far in this economy, each entrepreneur has a given private investment. They
make decisions on how to allocate capital between the collateralizable asset x
and their private investments. In this section, we study how entrepreneurs
choose among different private investments in equilibrium. Traditional capital
budgeting theories study it mainly from the firms’ (entrepreneurs’) perspective
and is confined to a partial equilibrium. In this section, however, we focus on
the effect of bank loans on the entrepreneurs’ choices. As the lending market
is endogenously determined in the aggregate economy, all firms’ decisions are
made in a general equilibrium.
A. An example with two choices for entrepreneurs
To keep the model solvable without losing insights, assume two perfectly
hedgeable securities yA and yB with two states ω1 and ω2 such that
yA(ω1) = ρ + , yA(ω2) = 0,
yB(ω1) = 0, yB(ω2) = ρ,
Pr(ω1) = Pr(ω2) =
1
2
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where  > 0 is an arbitrarily small number and ρ > 2. In each state, there’s
only one security generating a positive return. Furthermore, assume both yA
and yB are independent of x. Each entrepreneur can choose either yA or yB as
his personal investment at time 0 to maximize
Eui(aix + bi + ciyi) (1.18)
subject to
(i) aip + bi + ci = ei(0)p + ei(1)
(ii) yi ∈ {yA, yB}.
For convenience, define a type-A(type-B) entrepreneur as one choosing yA(yB).
The objective function for investors are the same as before without {yA, yB}.
In both scenarios: without bank lending or for exogenous bank lending, both
type-A and type-B entrepreneurs obtain the same loan contracts. As a result,
they always prefer yA to yB when maximizing equation (1.18). In equilibrium,
all entrepreneurs select yA.
With endogenous bank lending, however, bank loans are no longer the same
for both the type-A and type-B entrepreneurs. In other words, when type-A and
type-B entrepreneurs use the same quantity of asset x as collateral to borrow, the
collateral value, and hence the amount of the loan, will be different. The greater
the number of the same type of entrepreneurs in the economy, the less each
can borrow, because banks liquidate the collateral at a more distressed time, in
the same spirit as Shleifer and Vishny (1992). In the extreme case when all en-
trepreneurs choose yA, the collateral value for a potential type-B entrepreneur is
at the largest. The timing when the type-B entrepreneur defaults is associated
with a good return for all type-A entrepreneurs. When compensated by the bet-
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ter loan from banks, some entrepreneurs are expected to switch from yA to yB.
Overall, banks prefer those entrepreneurs whose wealth is negatively correlated
with the aggregate economy. The formal proof is in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Diversification) The measure of the set of entrepreneurs choosing the
inferior investment yB is positive if  is small enough.
Proof. Assume no entrepreneurs choose yB. In equilibrium, let the en-
trepreneurs in [0, δm] transact in the market and those in (δm, δ] borrow from
banks. The proof is for δm < δ only. A similar argument applies to δm = δ.
Denote by L(z) a price enabling investors to buy z units of x. It immediately
follows that the market equilibrium price pδm = L(aδmδm) and L(0) = p∗. The
collateral value function for A-type entrepreneurs is vA(β) = L(aδmδm + β(δ −
δm)). This is because banks can only sell collateral to investors when a type-
A entrepreneur defaults. Given there’s no B-type entrepreneurs, the collateral
value function for them is vB(β) ≥ p∗ − 1 for an arbitrarily small number 1 >
0, because the bank only liquidates x when A-type entrepreneurs obtain good
return yA = ρ. It must hold that vB(β) > vA(β).
Now, if a fraction of borrowers switch to security yB and use βδm units of x
as collateral for a loan, he can obtain βδmvB(βm) cash from the bank. Let  be
small enough so that βδmvB(βm)r > βδmvA(βm). Then the borrower achieves a
higher utility than before. Yet using βδm is not necessarily the optimal strategy
with collateral value function vB(β). The maximum utility with vB(β) is greater
than that with vA(β). Therefore, all borrowers should switch to security yB and
the equilibrium breaks down. The claim that no entrepreneurs choose security
yB is false and the proposition follows.
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In the proof of the proposition, we show that the inferior investment can only
be financed by borrowing. If an entrepreneur does not borrow, he must choose
the more profitable investment. This prediction is in line with the existing em-
pirical findings on the negative correlation between leverage and profitability.
Lemma 1 (Subsidized Loan) Leverage is essential for less profitable investments.
1.4.1 Summary
Our model predicts that banks can facilitate diversification among the en-
trepreneurs. Usually, banks minimize credit risk by lending to a diversified
group of entrepreneurs. With collateral, it is easier for banks to achieve this, be-
cause the collateral value is already based on the aggregate economy. The more
diversified the aggregate economy, the higher the collateral value (proposition
2). In a sense, even if a bank only lends to one entrepreneur, it faces the same
minimum risk as when it lends to many. Therefore, collateral lending makes it
easier for banks to diversify their risk.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chaper, we study an endogenous lending market that considers the inter-
action among borrowers. This interaction effect is absent in much of the exist-
ing financial literature. In this endogenous lending market, we are able to show
both the wealth and substitution effects in the relationship between returns of
two assets. The wealth effect, however, does not exist in the conventional asset
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pricing literature that assumes an exogenous lending market.
In addition, we also examine capital budgeting issues with a bank-firm joint
analysis by granting two investment options to entrepreneurs. Traditional cap-
ital budgeting theories often rank investments according to profitability. Using
a bank-firm joint analysis, we show that profitability is no longer the sole cri-
terion. Since banks manage a portfolio of credit risks, the correlation between
the two investments also plays a role. Less profitable investments could exist in
equilibrium due to subsidized loans from banks, if these investments are nega-
tively correlated with the aggregate economy. Moreover, the fact that they must
rely on loans is in line with empirical findings about the negative correlation
between leverage and profitability. Indeed, more profitable investments can be
executed without leverage in the equilibrium.
With the assumption of perfect information in the model, we mainly focus on
the benefits of using collateral to borrow, such as the reduced asset price volatil-
ity and diversification in an economy. The next chapter indicates, however, that
the use of collateral can cause two severe consequences: 1) market instability
and 2) contagion in an imperfect information environment where banks have
little information about entrepreneurs who are not their customers. This study
suggests that high quality information is essential in an economy that uses col-
lateral to borrow, more so than one that does not. As we mentioned in the in-
troduction, the use of collateral connects each individual’s borrowing capacity
to the aggregate economy, whereas, without collateral, this borrowing capacity
is determined at the individual level. In one sense, the use of collateral helps
create a more closely-linked economy. To fully exploit the advantage of such an
economy, high quality information is essential.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSET PRICE CYCLES AND BANK LENDING
2.1 Introduction
Previous studies on the relation between an asset’s price and bank lending have
explored the effect bank credit has on the pirce (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2001; Allen and Gale, 2000; He and Krishnamurthy, 2008). Unlike these papers,
we focus on assets that can be used as collateral for borrowing. It is important
to understand the impact of collateral on asset price paths because there are an
increasing number of assets that can serve as collateral due to securitization (Ra-
jan 2006; Gorton and Souleles, 2006; Coval, Jorek and Stafford, 2009; Gorton and
Metric, 2009), and because banks that hold collateral need to extract information
from the market price. When an asset can be used as collateral the market price
may not reflect all investors’ information because not everyone participates in
the market–some choose to deal with banks. Banks need not disclose informa-
tion on their collateral holdings nor on their borrowers, even though they are
experts in monitoring (Dibvig, 1984). This lack of transparency hinders banks
from knowing each other’s information, causing collateral to be misvalued, es-
pecially when liquidating an asset in distressed times, the value is likely to be
constrained by the available buyers’ wealth. Shleifer and Vishny (1991), for ex-
ample, have shown that the sale price of an asset in a distressed industry is less
than its fundamental value because potential buyers of the same distressed in-
dustry are often under financial pressures, too. In contrast to banks, the market
gathers public and private information via the equilibrium mechanism (Gross-
man and Stiglitz 1980), even though the market has less private information on
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individuals than banks.
In this paper, we show how these different approaches to information reve-
lation affect the price of a collateralizable asset. To do so, we construct an econ-
omy involving two entities: entrepreneurs and banks, and two assets: cash and
a collateralizable asset. Endowed with cash and the asset, each entrepreneur has
its own production opportunity. Each production opportunity requires cash as
an input. Because entrepreneurs’ wealth depends on production returns, so will
the price path of the asset. To show how the price path is affected by the financial
structure, we consider two kinds of economies–one relies solely on the capital
market (a market economy) to raise cash, while the other consists of both the
market and commercial banks (a banking economy). If entrepreneurs choose to
borrow from banks, they have to post this asset as collateral.
In the market economy, the price of the asset is low in the beginning when
entrepreneurs sell the asset to raise cash. As production returns realize, en-
trepreneurs repurchase the assets in the market, making the price increase
through time.
In the banking economy, banks are the dominant means for raising cash due
to their higher valuation of collateral. This is because a bank evaluates its bor-
rower’s collateral at the price at which it can be sold, constrained by the bank’s
limited information on other banks and entrepreneurs. This structure is justified
by the fact that banks don’t report their collateral holdings. In the beginning, the
price of the asset is at a higher level than that in the market economy because
there is no selling pressure. As production returns are realized, entrepreneurs
with good returns repay the loans to redeem the collateral. These transactions
are between entrepreneurs and banks, and therefore it has little effect on the
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asset’s price. Entrepreneurs with bad returns may default on the loans and con-
sequently the lenders liquidate the collateral to protect themselves. The liquida-
tion occurs because banks hold collateral only to protect their loans. The default
of a entrepreneur and the resulting collateral liquidation forces other banks that
hold the same asset as collateral to revise its value downward, demanding more
collateral from the entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs cannot fulfill this collat-
eral call, they have to default and forfeit their collateral to the lending banks.
As a result, all banks that hold the same asset as collateral liquidate simultane-
ously, driving down the asset’s price. As entrepreneurs’ production continues
after the panic liquidation period, entrepreneurs repurchase the asset from the
market. Aided by this repurchasing wave, the price recovers from its nadir.
Our model of collateral equilibrium has its root in a series of papers by
Geanakoplos (1997), Geanakoplos and Zame (1998), and Geanakoplos (2003). In
Geanakoplos (2003), he argues that asset price drops sharply when the wealth
transfers from the optimistic to the pessimistic following bad news on the as-
set’s fundamentals. But bad news also causes the asset’s volatility to hike, which
by itself can justify the price crash. To avoid the multiple effects of bad news,
we keep the asset’s fundamentals unchanged. Instead of optimistic/pessimistic
owners, we consider long term versus short term holders. In their model, all
parties are final consumers of the asset–but with different views regarding its
value. In contrast, we have two distinctive parties, banks and entrepreneurs,
which hold the asset for completely different reasons. Entrepreneurs consume
the asset in the final period, but banks hold it only as collateral for lending. The
value of collateral in their model depends on its fundamental value. The value
of collateral in our model depends on the estimated liquidation price that can
differ from its fundamental value.
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Our emphasis on financial structure relates our paper to the extensive liter-
ature on banking. This literature can be divided into two groups, one studying
the risk of banking, and the other studying banks and social welfare. Exam-
ples of the first group are Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Rajan (2005), Archaya,
Gale and Yorulmazer (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2010). Examples of the sec-
ond group are Dybvig (1984), Allen and Gale (1997), diamond and Rajan (2001).
Like Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2004), this paper shows
both the benefit and cost of banking. Banks increase social welfare, but banks
inhibit the transmission of information via the private dealings with their cus-
tomers. The role of information and asset prices began with Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and has grown to an important branch of research–market mi-
crostructure. O’Hara (2003) provides a review.
Bank lending is related to credit constraints in macroeconomics. Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1997) have shown that cred-
its based on a borrowers’ balance sheet may have a pro-cyclical effect on the
business cycle. Moore and Kiyotaki (1997) show how an exogenous shock to
the economy has ripple effects across time further amplified by the use of collat-
eral. In their model, the collateralizable asset itself is input to production. In our
model, however, the collateralizable asset plays no role in production except to
facilitate financing. While they emphasize the role of the leverage; we focus on
the role of bank liquidation in the market price.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on contagion. Contagion
can happen across assets or agents, via direct or indirect links. One example of
a direct link is that assets prices are correlated, as shown in King and Wadhwani
(1990), Calvo (1999) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Indirect contagion links
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arise from the asset-agent web. Assets that are owned by the same agent can
have contagion due to asset-agent-asset, a contagion spread by the common
owner who reduces his portfolio holdings after suffering a loss from one asset,
as in Kyle and Wei (2001). Similarly, we can have contagion in the form of agent-
asset-agent, as shown by Allen and Gale (2000b). This paper, however, contains
a contagion due to entrepreneur-bank-entrepreneur. One entrepreneur’s default
forces banks to demand more collateral from the remaining entrepreneurs, thus
triggering more entrepreneurs to default.
2.2 The Benchmark Model
This section presents the benchmark model.
2.2.1 The Entrepreneurs
We construct an economy consisting of two time periods 0 and 1, and N en-
trepreneurs, denoted by entrepreneur-i i = 1, 2, ..., N . The risk free rate is r ≥ 1.
At time 0, for i = 1, 2, ..., N , entrepreneur-i is endowed with ei(0) units of risky
asset x and ei(1) units of cash, denoted by e˜i = (ei(0), ei(1)). x can be traded at
time 0 in a competitive market where all entrepreneurs are price takers. At time
1, x will generate a random payoff x ∈ R+.
Next, we introduce entrepreneurs’ productions. The production is private
information and only known by its owner. It is characterized as constant re-
turns to scale and denoted by yi for entrepreneur-i, i = 1, 2, ..., N . Production yi
requires cash at time 0 and matures at time 1 before the payoff of x, generating
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a random return yi ∈ R+ per unit of input. For example, if c units of cash are
spent on production yi, the output will be cyi units of cash at time 1.
All entrepreneurs maximize the expected utility of their final wealth. As-
sume entrepreneur-i has utility function ui, and at time 0, chooses a wealth
portfolio wi = (ai, bi, ci) to maximize:
Eui(aix + bir + ciy) (2.1)
subject to
(i) aip + bi + ci = ei(0)p + ei(1),
(ii) ai ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0.
where a is the position on asset x, b is the cash holding, c is the investment in
production y, and p is the market price of x. The optimal demand function for
x is denoted by ai. ai is a function of the endowments (ei(0), ei(1)), risk free rate
r and the price p. In this section, we focus on the change of the asset price p and
cash wealth ei(1), so we often write ai as ai(p, ei(1)).
The formal definition of the market equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 3 (Market Equilibrium) At time 0, the market is in equilibrium if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(1)Each entrepreneur chooses an optimal portfolio (a, b, c);
(2)The market for x clears.
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2.2.2 The Banks
Now we add banks to the model. Banks only offer nonrecourse loans and thus
require collateral for protection. For the nonrecourse loan, if a borrower de-
faults, the bank can seize the collateral, but has no right to claim the borrower’s
wealth beyond the collateral. At time 0, entrepreneurs use x as collateral to
borrow from banks to finance their productions, and repay the loan at time 1
between the payoff of y and x. We choose this timing for two reasons. First, it
enables banks to avoid the uncertainty caused by x’s random payoff. Second,
it allow banks to focus on the market value of x rather than its fundamental
value. This is consistent with banks choosing to liquidate collateral in practice.
Assume further that the loan is of a discount type: entrepreneurs borrow l
R
and
repay l, where R is the discount rate charged by the banks.
Assume there are a sufficient number of banks in a competitive lending envi-
ronment. To preserve the stability of the economy, we situate banks in a minimal
risk environment, requiring them to perform safe lending without having a loss
in any state. To achieve this, collateral plays an essential role, as it protects banks
from a borrower’s default. In case default happens, the banks are assumed to
liquidate the collateral at time 1 before the payoff of x. Since the market is closed
at time 1, banks sell the collateral via over the counter. To protect the bank from
the loss, we impose the following condition.
Rule 2.2.1 (Safe Lending) To fully protect the loan, banks require from the borrowers
equal value or more of asset x as collateral.
A. The Banks’ Pricing Model of Collateral
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As assumed before, banks evaluate the collateral, not by its fundamental
value, but by the market value. Fundamental value is the utility obtained from
consuming or holding the asset. The market value is how much one receives
when selling it in the market. Since banks can only sell it in the future when the
borrowers default, at present, they have to use models to estimate the market
value. To do so, banks rely on their information about the potential buyers. We
assume banks know all the entrepreneurs’ endowments and utility functions,
but are unaware of the entrepreneurs’ production opportunities. A bank learns
this production information only if a entrepreneur asks for a loan. The bank is
unable to infer the other entrepreneurs’ productions nor does it disclose its lend-
ing activity. Besides the private information on their customers, banks observe
the public information, the price of x in the market.
The assumption that banks do not know the production information is not
essential to the model as long as banks do not have perfect information. The
results of the paper hold if banks overvalue the collateral. Allowing banks to
estimate the production information simply adds a probability layer to the re-
sults in the paper, for sometimes banks overvalue the collateral and other time
undervalue. Since the paper is primarily concerned with the scenario of banks’
overvaluing collateral, we simplify the model by assuming banks have no pro-
duction information. While banks can never hope to have the perfect informa-
tion on entrepreneurs, they rely on what the market price can reveal. As will be
shown later, the market price fails to inform banks because banks themselves
distort the market price.
According to the bank’s information, banks think entrepreneurs other than
his borrower at time 1 will maximize:
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Eui(aix + bi) (2.2)
subject to
(i) aip + bi = ei(0)p + ei(1)r.
The cash wealth grows to ei(1)r in the budget constraint because the bank
knows the cash ei(1) will earn the risk free rate r from time 0 to time 1. Assume
the demand function for x is a∗i (p, ei(1)). This demand ignores the production
opportunities. If the bank uses model v(β) to estimate the selling price for β
units of x, the model price v(β) has to satisfy
∑
j∈M
a∗j(v(β), ej(1)) = β +
∑
j∈M
ej(0), (2.3)
where M is the set of entrepreneurs excluding the borrower.
To loan out l safely, banks require β units of collateral such that Pr(βv(β) ≥
l) = 1, equivalent to βv(β) ≥ l. Since they are in a competitive lending market,
they can only demand an equal value of the collateral βv(β) = l.
Since the loan loss is already protected by the collateral in the default state,
the profits from repayment are zero due to competition: l − l
R
r = 0, that is,
R = r.
Lemma 2 (Lending Policy) If the banks perform safe lending, they demand β units
of x as collateral to lend l, such that βv(β) = l and charge the risk free rate r.
B. The entrepreneurs’ optimal borrowing
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At time 1, after the outcome of y, the entrepreneurs will decide how to repay
the loan. We first introduce a partial repayment option.
Definition 4 (Partial Repayment Option) When repaying the loan, entrepreneurs
are allowed to repay a fraction of the loan to redeem the collateral at the same ratio, that
is, repay κl to redeem κβ units of x.
Banks are not concerned about the partial repayment option because the loan
is fully secured by the collateral, as reflected in the pricing model v. But this
option allows entrepreneurs to utilize more strategies, such as project financing,
thus entrepreneurs are better off with the option than without.
We now solve the entrepreneurs’ optimal repayment strategy. Assume
entrepreneur-i at time 0 chooses strategy w˜i = (βi, bi), where βi is the amount of
x used as collateral to borrow βiv(βi)
r
and bi is the position on cash. His wealth
status before repaying the loan is (ei(0)−βi)x+bir+(ei(1)−bi +
βv(βi)
r
)yi. After yi
realizes, assume for the entrepreneur it is optimal to repay κiβiv(βi) to redeem
κiβi units of x (Without the partial repayment option, κi can only be 0 or 1), then
κi solves
max
κi
Eu((ei(0)− βi)x + bir + (
βiv(βi)
r
+ ei(1)− bi)yi + κiβix− κiβiv(βi)), (2.4)
subject to
(i) 0 ≤ κi ≤ 1.
The optimal κi is a function of ei(0), ei(1), ri, bi, βi, and yi. We only focus on yi
and write κ as κ(yi). In an example of a project financing loan for yi, κi would
look like
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κi = 1(βiv(βi)+ei(1)−bi)yi≥βiv(βi) +
(βiv(βi) + ei(1)− bi)yi
βiv(βi)
1(βiv(βi)+ei(1)−bi)yi<βiv(βi).
(2.5)
This type of repayment cannot be enforced by banks because the loan is as-
sumed to be nonrecourse.
After solving κ, the entrepreneur at time 0 chooses a wealth portfolio w˜i =
(βi, bi) to maximize
Eui((ei(0)− βi)x + bir + (
βiv(βi)
r
+ ei(1)− bi)yi + κiβi(x− v(βi))) (2.6)
subject to
(i) 0 ≤ bi ≤ ei(1), and
(ii) 0 ≤ βi ≤ ei(0).
2.2.3 The Equilibrium with both Banks and the Market
In this section, we consider an economy with both banks and the market. The
combined markets work as follows:
1. Entrepreneurs ask the loan terms from a bank, and then calculate the op-
timal borrowing and its associated utility;
2. Entrepreneurs then submit to the market auctioneer a fraction of their de-
mands where there’s more utility than from borrowing as in the previous
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step;
3. Entrepreneurs whose demands are not accepted in the market will return
to the bank to borrow
Ask loans =⇒ Submit demands =⇒


Transact in the market if demands are cleared
Return to banks if demands are not cleared
The equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Bank and Market Equilibrium) At time 0, the economy is in equi-
librium if the following three conditions are satisfied:
(1)The loan contracts are consistent with the banks’ information and revealed in the
market;
(2)Entrepreneurs’ strategies are optimal;
(3)The market clears for x.
Although there is more than one mechanism for bank lending and the mar-
ket, the one we use narrows the entrepreneurs’ choices so that they choose only
one bank and one method of financing: either selling x in the market or bor-
rowing from banks. The reason for using one bank is to prevent the leakage of
information on the entrepreneur’s production. A entrepreneur will obtain the
same loan contract no matter which bank he chooses. Different entrepreneurs
may obtain different loans, however. The reason for one financing is to keep the
model solvable.
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Since entrepreneurs are submitting demands that are not continuous as
shown in Figure 2.1, the market auctioneer may be unable to set a price satisfy-
ing all the entrepreneurs’ demands. Some of the entrepreneurs’ demands have
to be excluded to clear the market. Viewing the market auctioneer as analogous
to a limit order book, he’ll ignore all bid orders at low prices and ask orders at
high prices.
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Figure 2.1: Entrepreneur-1’s partially revealing demand curve for x in the
existence of banks
Since entrepreneurs are not obliged to repay the loan, they can default vol-
untarily, in a sense, their purpose for borrowing is to sell asset x to the bank. To
prevent this behavior, we suppose that the entrepreneurs start in equilibrium.
Moreover, if all entrepreneurs are in equilibrium, so is any subgroup. The mar-
ket price remains the same when some are absent. Simply by looking at the
price, banks find no contradiction of their model.
Condition 2.2.1 (Starting Equilibrium) Without production, all entrepreneurs
start in equilibrium. In other words, there exists a price p˜ such that each entrepreneur’s
50
endowment (ei(0), ei(1)) maximizes
Eui(ax + br) (2.7)
subject to
(i) ap˜ + b = ei(0)p˜ + ei(1),
(ii) a ≥ 0, and b ≥ 0.
Assume the optimal demand for x to the problem above is a˜i(p, ei(1)). We
require entrepreneurs to have a downward sloping demand function of price p
in the above maximization problem.
Condition 2.2.2 (Downward Demands) The demand function a˜i is a decreasing
function of price p, ∂a˜i
∂p
≤ 0, for all i ∈ N .
Recall that ai is the entrepreneur’s optimal demand function to the original
maximization problem (2.1). We compare ai and a˜i and impose the following
condition.
Condition 2.2.3 (Capital Competing) Entrepreneurs will demand less x if they
have the production opportunities, that is, for all i ∈ N , a˜i(p, ei(1)) > ai(p, ei(1)),
ceteris paribus. In a sense, production competes with x for capital.
This condition excludes production that can be a hedge against x. A portfolio of
hedged assets can generate high returns with little risk, making the combination
more attractive than individually. Finally, we have to make sure the market is
not empty.
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Condition 2.2.4 (Nonempty Market) At least one of the entrepreneurs has no pro-
duction.
Under the four conditions, we prove the following no asset sale equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (No Asset Sale Equilibrium) In the time 0 bank and market equilib-
rium, no entrepreneurs sell x in the market regardless of the partial repayment option.
The market price p0 is equal to p˜ in condition 2.2.1. This price confirms the banks’ belief
that no entrepreneurs have productions other than their customers.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. To keep the notation simple, in this proof,
we drop the cash wealth argument in all the demand functions, and write them
as a function of only price. Assume that there exists such an entrepreneur j
that sells βj > 0 units of x in the market. Denote the market price by p0 and
the remaining entrepreneurs in the market by a set M . At current price p0, the
market clearing condition requires
∑
i∈M ai(p0) =
∑
i∈M ei(0). From the capital
competing condition 2.2.3, we have for every i ∈ M , a˜i(p0) ≥ ai(p0). It thus
follows that
∑
i∈M a˜i(p0) ≥
∑
i∈M ei(0). According to the starting equilibrium
condition 2.2.1 a˜i(p) = ei(0) , we obtain
∑
i∈M a˜i(p0) ≥
∑
i∈M a˜i(p). From the
downward demand condition 2.2.2, it immediately follows p0 ≤ p. From the
following inequalities:
∑
i∈M\j
a˜i(p0) ≥ βj +
∑
i∈M\j
ei(0) (2.8)
a˜i(p0) = ei(0), for all i ∈ N \M, (2.9)
sum them up and obtain
∑
i∈N\j a˜i(p0) ≥ βi +
∑
i∈N\j ei(0).
Next, we compute the bank’s modelling value v(βj) if βj units are used
as collateral. According to the bank’s pricing model (2.3), βj will solve
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∑
i∈N\j a
∗
i (v(βj)) = βj +
∑
i∈N\j ei(0). Now we want to show that v(βj) ≥ rp0.
It suffices to prove that a∗i (p) = a˜i(rp). If we multiple the budget constraint
of maximization problem (2.1) by r, we will have the same budget constraint
as in problem (2.3), except with the new price rp. So the two maximiza-
tion problems (2.3) and (2.7) are essentially the same. Finally, according to∑
i∈N\j a
∗
i (v(βj)) = βj +
∑
i∈N\j ei(0) ≤
∑
i∈N\j a˜i(p0), we have v(βj) ≥ rp0.
Assume entrepreneur-j’s optimal cash holding is bj . His wealth portfolio is
wj = (ej(0)− βj, bj, ej(1)− bj + βjp0). The utility from wj is umkt = Euj((ej(0)−
βj)x+bjr+(ej(1)−bj +βjp0)yj). If instead, he uses βj units of collateral x to bor-
row from the bank, and chooses not to repay the loan regardless ofthe outcome
of yi, that is κ(ei(0), ei(1), r, βj, bi, yi) = 0 for all yi ∈ R+. In addition, this repay-
ment strategy doesn’t require the partial repayment option. For this borrowing
strategy, he achieves ubank = Euj((ej(0) − βj)x + bjr + (ej(1) − bj +
βjv(βj )
r
)yj),
which is greater than umkt because of
v(βj)
r
≥ p0. Yet, ubank is not the maximal
utility he can gain from borrowing. So the point (p0, βj) does not belong to the
demands he submits to the market auctioneer. This is a contradiction. We thus
establish that in equilibrium, no entrepreneurs sell x. If there’s no seller, there
should be no buyer. For those entrepreneurs that stay at the market, they op-
timally hold their endowment. Since there’s at least one entrepreneur in the
market, the price is set at p0 = p˜.
At time 1, when entrepreneurs decide how to repay the loan, we have the
following optimal repayment proposition. But we need one more condition.
Condition 2.2.5 (Positive Income Effect) ∂a˜i
∂ei(1)
≥ 0, that is, without production,
entrepreneurs will demand more x as their cash wealth increases.
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Proposition 8 (Optimal Repayment) κ(y) is a nondecreasing function of y. With
the partial repayment option, we have κ(0) = 0 and κ(r) = 1. Without the option, we
can find a number 0 ≤ y∗ ≤ 1 such that κ(y) = 1y>y∗ . Simply stated, entrepreneurs
fully repay the loan if y ≥ r and default completely if y = 0.
Proof. We prove with the partial repayment option only. A similar argument
applies to the case without the option. When the entrepreneurs decide how
to repay the loan, they essentially solve problem (2.4). We now redefine the
problem so that the entrepreneur maximizes:
Eui(ax + b) (2.10)
subject to
(i) av(βi) + b = (ei(0)− βi)v(βi) + bir + (ei(1)− bi +
βiv(βi)
r
)yi, and
(ii) ei(0)− βi ≤ a ≤ ei(0).
In the budget constraint, v(βi) becomes the price, as it is the unit cost for
the entrepreneur to acquire x from the bank. The optimal demand for x de-
pends on yi. We denote it by A(yi) = min(max(a∗i , ei(0)), ei(0) − βi), where
a∗i = a
∗
i (v(βi), (bir + (ei(1) − bi +
βiv(βi)
r
)yi)) as derived from problem (2.3).
Since a∗i (pr, eir) = a˜i(p, ei), it follows that a∗i is also a nondecreasing func-
tion of cash wealth and A(yi) is a nondecreasing function of yi. Now that
κ(yi) =
A(yi)−(ei(0)−βi)
βi
, κ(yi) is also a nondecreasing function of yi.
Finally, we need to show κ(1) = 1 and κ(0) = 0. If y ≥ r, we can find
a price p∗ such that a∗i (p∗, bir + (ei(1) − bi)yi + βiv(βi)(
yi
r
− 1)) = ei(0). Since
bir + (ei(1) − bi)yi + βiv(βi)(
yi
r
− 1) ≥ ei(1)r and by the starting equilibrium
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condition 2.2.1, a∗i (p˜r, ei(1)r) = ei(0), it follows that p∗ ≥ p˜r ≥ v(βj). The last
inequality holds because
∑
j∈N\i
a∗(rp˜, rej(1)) =
∑
j∈N\i
ej(1) ≤ βi +
∑
j∈N\i
ej(1) =
∑
j∈N\i
a∗(v(βj), rej(1)) (2.11)
At price p∗, (ei(0)−βi)p∗+bir+(ei(1)−bi+
βiv(βi)
r
)yi ≤ ei(0)p
∗+bir+(ei(1)−bi)yi+
βiv(βi)(
yi
r
− 1), so (ei(0)− βi, bir + (ei(1)− bi +
βiv(βi)
r
)yi) meets the same budget
constraint as the optimal portfolio (ei(0), bir + (ei(1) − bi +
βiv(βi)
r
)yi − βiv(βi))
and therefore is inferior to the optimal.
Next, we prove κ = 0 if y = 0. If bi = 0, then κ = 0 is self evident for
entrepreneurs have no cash. For bi > 0, we prove by contradiction. Assume
the entrepreneur repays g ≤ bir to the bank to redeem h = gv(βi) units of x
and the optimal repayment strategy is κ(yi). Now we construct a new borrow-
ing strategy (β ′, bi − gr ) with a new repayment function k
′(yi) =
k(yi)βi−h
βi−h
where
β ′v(β ′) = (βi − h)v(βi). It immediately follows that β ′ ≤ βi − h. In this new
strategy, the time 1 wealth after repaying the loan is
(ei(0)−β
′)x+(bi−
g
r
)r+(ei(1)−bi+
g
r
+
β ′v(β ′)
r
)yi+k
′(yi)((β
′)x−β ′v(β ′)). (2.12)
The cash generated from production is (ei(1)− bi + gr +
β′v(β′)
r
)yi = (ei(1)− bi +
βv(β)
r
)yi, the same as the old strategy. This is also true for the second part of
the cash component (bir − g)− k′(yi)β ′v(β ′) = br − k(yi)βiv(βi). Now it suffices
to show the position in x is more in the new strategy than in the old, and the
contradiction is found. Indeed, we have
ei(0)− β
′ + κ′β ′ = ei(0)− β
′(
κβi − βi
βi − h
) ≥ ei(0) + κβi − βi. (2.13)
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2.2.4 Summary
At time 0, when banks overvalue the collateral, they attract entrepreneurs that
need cash to produce away. The market price thus reflects information only
from entrepreneurs that do not have production. Seen from such a price, banks
find a confirmation of their beliefs that other entrepreneurs don’t have produc-
tion. The fact that banks can distort the market price cautions against the use of
mark-to-market accounting.
At time 1, if there are entrepreneurs that default, banks will liquidate the
collateral. The price they actually obtain could be lower than their model price.
This discrepancy can be decomposed into two parts. The first is the banks’
limited information about entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may have less wealth
than the banks previous thought. The second is the banks’ limited information
on each other. Even if a bank knows every entrepreneur’s wealth and is able to
calculate correctly the selling price for his own liquidation, he still faces price
uncertainty because other banks may liquidate at the same time.
One reason the market price fails to remedy the limited information sharing
among banks is that there is no trading at such price.
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2.3 Implications for the Asset’s Price
2.3.1 A Multi-period Model
Based on the insight of the benchmark model, we study two implications: the
asset price path of x over time and how contagion spreads among entrepreneurs
via banks. In order to show this, we build a model simple enough to have a
closed-form solution. The new economy consists of four time periods 0, 1, 2 and
3, and three entrepreneurs: entrepreneur-0, entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2.
The risk free rate is assumed to be r. At time 0, each entrepreneur is endowed
with 1
3
unit of asset x and 1 unit of cash, as denoted by ei(0) = (13 , 1), for i =
0, 1, 2. The number in the parentheses indicates the time. This rule applies to
all notation in this section. So, the aggregate economy has 1 unit of asset x and
3 units of cash. Asset x generates a random payoff x at the final time 3 with
mean 1 and second moment σ2 (not variance). All entrepreneurs consume their
wealth only at time 3. For convenience, we denote by N = {0, 1, 2} the index set
of entrepreneurs. In this economy, each entrepreneur has enough cash to buy
all asset x, because the price of x can be shown to be less than 1 in an economy
with risk averse entrepreneurs. As a result, the entrepreneurs have no wealth
constraint when trading x.
The productions y1 and y2 are assumed to be binary random variables owned
by entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 only. While both require cash at time 0,
they mature at different times: yi in time i, i = 1, 2. We define yi as follows:
yi =


θ, with probability qi
0, with probability 1− qi
, (2.14)
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where θ > 1. The expected return is qiθ. To unify notation, we assign a no return
production y0 to entrepreneur-0 such that Pr(y0 = 0) = 1. Moreover, we assume
that x, y1 and y2 are independent.
The only difference between the two returns is the probability of obtaining
a good outcome. For simplicity, we assume that q1
r
> q2
r2
, that is, entrepreneur-1
has a better production technology than entrepreneur-2.
Because of the agency problem (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), we assume that
entrepreneurs behave myopically when maximizing the present value of the
future cash flows.
Condition 2.3.1 (Myopia) All entrepreneurs are myopic.
The entrepreneurs’ production decisions proceed as follows. At time 0,
entrepreneur-i chooses a wealth portfolio wi(0) = (ai(0), bi(0), ci(0)) to maxi-
mize the time 0 present value of future cash flows, where ai(0) is the amount of
x, bi(0), the amount of cash, and ci(0), the amount of capital spent on the pro-
duction. Given a wealth portfolio wi(0) = (ai(0), bi(0), ci(0)), the time 0 present
value is defined as P (wi(0), 0) =
ai(0)x−
(ai(0)x)
2
γ
r3
+bi(0)+
ci(0)θ1yi
ri
. Here we use 1yi as
the indicator function of the good outcome of production yi. The present value
of asset x is assumed to be
E(ai(0)x−
(ai(0)x)
2
γ
)
r3
where the risk aversion is reflected in
the risk compensated expected payoff, not the discount rate r, and r3 in the de-
nominator indicates the payoff is at time 3. That of production is assumed to be
Eci(0)θ1yi
ri
where the denominator ri indicates the production yields at time i and
the cash bi(0) remains bi(0). There’s no explicit risk adjustment for production
because the return θ is risk adjusted. P is the function used by all entrepreneurs
to discount future cash flows.
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We denote the market price of x at time t by pt, for t = 0, 1, 2. All en-
trepreneurs act as price taker in a competitive market. Short positions are ex-
cluded for they can lead to negative wealth.
The time 0 decision is summarized as follows:
Problem 1 (Time 0 Market) At time 0, entrepreneur-i, for i ∈ N , chooses a wealth
portfolio wi(0) = (ai(0), bi(0), ci(0)) to maximize:
P (wi(0)) =
E(ai(0)x)−
1
γ
E(ai(0)x)
2
r3
+ bi(0) +
ci(0)qiθ
ri
, (2.15)
subject to
(i) ai(0)p0 + bi(0) + ci(0) = 13p0 + 1, and
(ii) ai(0) ≤ 1, bi(0) ≥ 0 and ci(0) ≥ 0.
2.3.2 Market Equilibrium at t=0
For problem 1, we obtain
ci(0) = 0, if qiθri ≤ 1; (2.16)
bi(0) = 0, if qiθri > 1. (2.17)
qiθ
ri
≤ 1 is a trivial case in the model, so we focus on the case qiθ
ri
> 1, that is,
investing in production is better than merely holding cash. We make this as a
condition in the model.
Condition 2.3.2 (Profitable Production) Productions y1 and y2 are preferred to cash
holding, that is, q1θ
r
> 1 and q2θ
r2
> 1.
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For two productive entrepreneurs, the demand function for x is
ai(0) = 0, if p0 ≥ 1qiθr3−i
ai(0) =
γ(1−p0qiθr
3−i)
2σ2
, if 1
qiθr3−i
> p0 >
1− 2σ
2
γ
qiθr3−i
ai(0) = 1, if p0 ≤
1− 2σ
2
γ
qiθr3−i
. (2.18)
This set of equations means that, as the expected return of production increases,
the entrepreneur is willing to hold less x and sell more. The price of x thus
depends on the opportunity cost of the cash. Since entrepreneurs don’t hold
cash, bi(0) = 1, they put the rest of their wealth in production ci(0) = 1 + (13 −
ai(0))p0, for i = 1, 2.
For the unproductive entrepreneur-0, he has no production, so it follows that
c0(0) = 0, and
a0(0) = 0, if p0 ≥ r−3
a0(0) =
γ(1−p0r3)
2σ2
, if r−3(1− 2σ
2
γ
) < p0 < r
−3
a0(0) = 1, if p0 ≤ r−3(1− 2σ
2
γ
), (2.19)
and b0(0) = 1 + 13p0 − a0(0)p0.
Definition 6 (Market Equilibrium) In the x market at time 0, entrepreneur-i sub-
mits to the market auctioneer the demand function ai(0) according to equations (2.18)
or (2.19), i ∈ N . The market auctioneer will then set a price p0. In equilibrium,
(i)The Entrepreneurs’ holdings are optimal, and
(ii)The market clears at the price p0, a1(0) + a2(0) + a0(0) = 1.
In this economy entrepreneur-1 is the most willing to sell x, followed by
entrepreneur-2 and entrepreneur-0, according to the rank of the production
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Figure 2.2: All entrepreneurs hold x
profitability. The asset price of x is thus driven by the entrepreneurs’ production
decisions in addition to its risk.
CASE 1: Every entrepreneur holds a nonzero amount of x
In this case, we have a0(0) =
γ(1−p0r3)
2σ2
, a1(0) =
γ(1−p0q1θr2)
2σ2
and a2(0) =
γ(1−p0q2θr)
2σ2
. The market clearing condition is
γ(1− p0r
3)
2σ2
+
γ(1− p0q1θr
2)
2σ2
+
γ(1− p0q2θr)
2σ2
= 1. (2.20)
Solving gives the price p0 =
3−2 σ
2
γ
r3+q1θr2+q2θr
. From the condition of
entrepreneur-1’s nonzero x holding a1(0) =
γ(1−p0q1θr2)
2σ2
> 0, we require p0 <
1
q1θr2
, or
3−2 σ
2
γ
r3+q1θr2+q2θr
< 1
q1θr2
. Figure 2.2 illustrates this case.
CASE 2: Entrepreneur-2 and entrepreneur-0 hold a nonzero amount of x
In this case, we have a0(0) =
γ(1−p0r3)
2σ2
, a1(0) = 0 and a2(0) =
γ(1−p0q2θr)
2σ2
. The
market clearing condition is then
γ(1− p0q2θr)
2σ2
+
γ(1− p0r
3)
2σ2
= 1. (2.21)
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Solving gives the price p0 =
2−2 σ
2
γ
r3+q2θr
. From the x holding conditions of
entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2, we require 1
q2θr
> p0 ≥
1
q1θr2
. Figure 2.3
illustrates this case.
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Figure 2.3: Only entrepreneur-0 and entrepreneur-2 hold x
CASE 3: Only entrepreneur-0 holds x
In this case, we have a0(0) = 1 and a1(0) = a2(0) = 0. The market clearing
condition is then
γ(1− p0r
3)
2σ2
= 1. (2.22)
Solving gives the price p0 = r−3(1 − 2σ
2
γ
). We require p0 ≥ 1q2θr here. Figure 2.4
illustrates this case.
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Figure 2.4: Only entrepreneur-0 holds x
These results can be summarized as follows.
Result 1 In market equilibrium we have
p0 =
3− 2σ
2
γ
r3 + q1θr2 + q2θr
, if 2− 2σ
2
γ
< r
3+q2θr
q1θr2
(2.23)
p0 =
2− 2σ
2
γ
r3 + q2θr
, if r
3+q2θr
q1θr2
≤ 2− 2σ
2
γ
≤ r
3+q2θr
q2θr
p0 = r
−3(1− 2
σ2
γ
), if 2− 2σ
2
γ
> r
3+q2θr
q2θr
The discount rate in the price includes the opportunity cost of cash: q1θr2 and q2θr,
which is often greater than the risk free rate.
2.3.3 Bank Lending
As in the benchmark model, both of the two productive entrepreneurs can bor-
row from banks at time 0 and repay the loan after the production pays off. So
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entrepreneur-1 will repay the loan at time 1 and entrepreneur-2 at time 2. As-
sume bank-i lends to entrepreneur-i using the model vi for the collateral value.
The loan is also a discount type. With collateral value l, entrepreneur-1 can
borrow l
R
and entrepreneur-2 l
R2
, where R is the loan discount rate charged by
banks. Now denote the entrepreneurs’ wealth portfolio by w˜i = (13−βi(0), bi(0))
where βi(0) is the amount of x used as collateral to borrow R−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0))
from bank-i, and bi(0) is the cash holding. The “0” in vi(βi, 0) indicates the time
bank-i models the value of x, for banks need to update the valuation every pe-
riod. This wealth portfolio states that the entrepreneur-i holds 1
3
− βi units of x
and bi(0) cash, spends 1− bi(0)+R−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) on production yi, and posts
βi(0) units of x to bank-i as collateral.
First, we need to compute the collateral value vi(βi, 0) for bank-i and formu-
late the bank’s lending policy.
Lemma 3 (Lending Policy) For i = 1, 2, bank-i lends to entrepreneur-i at time 0 and
entrepreneur-i will repay it at time i. If entrepreneur-i at time 0 gives βi(0) units of x to
bank-i as collateral, bank-i will lend R−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) to entrepreneur-i. vi() can be
calculated as vi(0, βi(0)) = ri−3(1− 2σ
2
3γ
− σ
2
γ
βi(0)). Since banks are protected from loss
in each state, the loan discount rate will be R = r, due to a competitive lending market.
Proof. Upon an entrepreneur-i’s default, bank-i sells βi(0) units of x in the mar-
ket. According to its limited information, bank-i assumes that the other two en-
trepreneurs are both of the unproductive type with the same demand function
α(p) = γ(1−r
3−ip)
2σ2
. Therefore, for them to hold 2
3
+βi(0), the selling price has to be
γ(1−r3−ivi(0,βi(0)))
2σ2
= 1
3
+ βi(0)
2
. Solve to obtain vi(0, βi(0)) = ri−3(1− 2σ
2
3γ
− σ
2
γ
βi(0)).
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The assumption of linking collateral value to the future price follows Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1994). As more x is used as collateral to borrow, the value
per unit of collateral will decline. This fact can also be seen directly from the
equation for v. To simplify the model, we assume βv is an increasing function
of β. The following condition assures this.
Condition 2.3.3
σ2
γ
<
1
2
(2.24)
Entrepreneurs can also use their endowed cash to invest in production. For
the three sources of funding for production, we can establish a pecking order:
internal cash is better than a bank loan and a bank loan is better than a direct
sale in the market. The second claim has already been proved in the benchmark
model. Now we only need to show internal cash is better than a bank loan.
Since entrepreneur-0 doesn’t need to borrow from the bank, we focus only on
entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2.
Result 2 (Cash Optimality) To finance yi, entrepreneur-i always prefers cash to the
loan from bank-i, for i = 1, 2.
Proof. We only prove it with the partial repayment option. A similar argument
applies where the option is not allowed. We prove this by contradiction. As-
sume the optimal wealth portfolio for entrepreneur-i is w˜i(0) = (13 − βi(0), bi(0))
where βi(0) > 0 and bi(0) > 0. Then at time i, the entrepreneur will have 13−βi(0)
units of x on hand, bi(0) + (1 − bi(0) + r−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))yi in cash, and a loan
contract “borrowing βi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) from bank with collateral βi(0) unit of x”.
The cash component consists of the retained cash “bi(0)” from time 0 and the
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payoff (1 − bi(0) + r−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))yi from production. When repaying the
loan at time i, entrepreneur-i will maximize
r3−iE(Ax−
Ax
γ
) + B (2.25)
subject to
(i)Avi(0, βi(0))+B = ( 13−βi)vi(0, βi(0))+b0(i)r
i+(1−bi(0)+r
−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))yi,
(ii) 1
3
− βi ≤ A ≤
1
3
.
We know that at price p = r3−i(1− 2σ
2
3γ
) the entrepreneur optimally holds 1
3
units
of x, if he has no wealth constraint. For price vi(0, βi(0)) ≤ p, the entrepreneurs
will demand more than 1
3
if possible. This strong demand for x implies the en-
trepreneur will repay as much of the loan as he can. Whether the entrepreneur
can repay the loan depends on the outcome of production at time i. We thus
consider two cases separately and, for each case, construct a new wealth port-
folio dominating the current one.
Case one: bi(0)ri ≥ βi(0)vi(0, βi(0))
In this case, entrepreneur-i can repay the loan regardless of the return of yi.
After repaying the loan, the entrepreneur will have 1
3
unit of x and bi(0)ri −
βi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) + (1 − bi(0) + r
−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))yi in cash. But a new wealth
portfolio without borrowing at time 0 w˜∗1(0) = (
1
3
, bi(0)− r
−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0))) can
exactly replicate this time 1 payoff.
Case two: bi(0)ri < βi(0)vi(0, βi(0))
In this case, entrepreneur-i can no longer repay the full amount of the loan
if production yields zero. Using cash bi(0)ri, the entrepreneur will be able to
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redeem bi(0)r
i
vi(0,βi(0))
units of x. His financial status at time 1 in the two different
states of yi’s return are

(1
3
− βi(0) +
bi(0)ri
vi(0,βi(0))
) units of x and zero in cash, if yi = 0
1
3
units of x and (1− bi(0) + r−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))θ
+bi(0)r
i − βi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) in cash, if yi = θ
(2.26)
We construct a new wealth portfolio w˜′i(0) = (
1
3
− β ′i(0), 0), such that
1 + r−iβ ′i(0)vi(0, β
′
i(0)) = 1− bi(0) + r
−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)). (2.27)
In this new portfolio, entrepreneur-i maintains the same spending on yi by
using cash first and then financing the difference with borrowing. The wealth
portfolio at time 0 changes to


1
3
− β ′i(0) units of x and zero in cash, if yi = 0
1
3
units of x and (1 + r−iβ ′i(0)vi(0, β ′i(0)))θ − β ′i(0)vi(0, β ′i(0)) in cash, if yi = θ
(2.28)
Equation (2.27) guarantees that the two strategies generate the same wealth
under the good return of yi at time 1. The difference between the two strate-
gies, however, is the position of x after the bad return of yi. We claim
1
3
−β ′i(0) >
1
3
−βi(0)+
bi(0)ri
vi(0,βi(0))
. From equation (2.27), we have β ′i(0)vi(0, β ′i(0)) =
βi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) − bi(0)r
i. It follows that β ′i(0)vi(0, βi(0)) > βi(0)vi(0, βi(0)) −
bi(0)r
i, for vi(0, ·) is a decreasing function and β ′i(0) < βi(0). Therefore the new
strategy is better than the original one, which contradicts the optimality of the
original. The proposition follows.
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Remark 4 The result is stronger than that in the optimal repayment proposition 8.
In that proposition, entrepreneurs will not necessarily use cash first, instead, the opti-
mal capital structure has the combination of both cash and loans. The result on cash
optimality is derived from a more structured model.
Now we compute the entrepreneur-i’s optimal borrowing strategy, for i =
1, 2. The entrepreneurs maximize
max
βi(0),bi(0)
{r−3[E(
1
3
− βi(0)1Di)x−
1
γ
E((
1
3
− βi(0)1Di)x)
2] + bi(0) + qiθr
−i(1− bi(0))
+qiθr
−i(r−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))− r
−iqiβi(0)vi(0, βi(0))}, (2.29)
subject to
(i)0 ≤ βi(0) ≤ 13 , and
(ii)0 ≤ bi(0) ≤ 1.
where 1Di is the indicator function regarding default.
The Lagrange equation is
L = r−3[E(
1
3
− βi(0)1Di)x−
1
γ
E((
1
3
− βi(0)1Di)x)
2]
+bi(0) + r
−iqiθ(1− bi(0) + r
−iβi(0)vi(0, βi(0)))− r
−iqiβi(0)vi(0, βi(0))
+λ1(
1
3
− βi(0)) + λ2βi(0) + λ3(1− bi(0)) + λ4bi(0) (2.30)
with Lagrange multipliers λj ≥ 0, for j ∈ [1, 4], and complementary slackness
conditions:
λ1(βi(0)−
1
3
) = 0 (2.31)
λ2βi(0) = 0 (2.32)
λ3(bi(0)− 1) = 0 (2.33)
λ4bi(0) = 0. (2.34)
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From proposition 2, we see that if the entrepreneur hasn’t spent all endowed
cash on production, namely, bi(0) > 0, then there’s no borrowing, thus no risk of
default, βi(0) = 0 and 1D = 0. In the slackness condition, we have λ4 = 0. Taking
derivatives with respect to bi(0) in the Lagrange equation generates 1− qiθr−i−
λ3 = 0. Since 1 − qiθr−i < 0, we must have λ3 < 0, which is a contradiction.
So it’s impossible for entrepreneurs to retain cash if the production is profitable,
qiθr
−i > 1. In other words, we must have bi(0) = 0.
After the entrepreneurs spend all of their endowed cash on production, they
can still borrow from banks to produce more. Because of the “all or nothing”
characteristics of production, entrepreneurs will default on the loan completely
if they suffer a bad return from production. It thus follows that 1Di = 1 − 1yi .
Recall that bank-i uses the pricing model vi(0, βi(0)) = ri−3(1 − 23
σ2
γ
− σ
2
γ
βi(0)).
Taking derivatives with respect to βi(0), we have
(βi(0)) −r−3[(1− qi) +
(1− qi)σ
2(2βi(0)−
2
3
)
γ
]
+r−6[qi(r
−iθ − 1)(1−
2σ2
3γ
−
2σ2
γ
βi(0))]− λ1 + λ2 = 0 (2.35)
The solution is
βi(0) =
(qiθr
−3−i − qir
−3 − 1 + qi)(1−
2
3
σ2
γ
)
2σ2
γ
(qiθr−3−i − qir−3 − qi + 1)
, if qiθr
−3−i−qir−3−1+qi
qir−3(θr−i−1)
< 4σ
2
3γ
βi(0) =
1
3
, if qiθr
−3−i−qir−3−1+qi
qir−3(θr−i−1)
≥ 4σ
2
3γ
. (2.36)
Now with both banks and the market, we will obtain the following equilib-
rium.
Result 3 (Market and Banking Equilibrium) According to proposition 7, both
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entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 optimally borrow from banks and entrepreneur-0
stays in the market with market price p0 = r−3(1− 2σ
2
3γ
).
2.4 The Price Path of x in the Two Economies
In this section, we calculate the price paths of x in the two different economies–
the banking economy and the market economy, and document a contagion ef-
fect at time 1. Even without any outside impact on the price, the price will grow
at the market interest rate. To focus on the effect from the financial structures,
we set the gross interest rate to be one, r = 1.
2.4.1 The Price Paths of x in Banking Economy
At Time 0
At time 0, denote the optimal borrowing for entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2
by β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)) and β2(0)v2(0, β1(0)), respectively, where β1(0) and β2(0) are
the required amount of collateral x. In the market, entrepreneur-0 submits his
demand curve a0(0) =
γ(1−p0)
2σ2
, and the market sets a price p0 so that a0(0) = 13 .
The solution yields the market price at time 0, p0 = 1− 23
σ2
γ
.
At Time 1
At time 1, if entrepreneur-1 has a good return from production y1, he repays
the loan to redeem the collateral. After that, he is holding 1
3
units of x and
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(β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)) + 1)θ − β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)) in cash. Entrepreneur-0 at this time
holds 1
3
units of x and 1 cash. Entrepreneur-2 holds 1
3
− β2(0) units of x, but has
no cash, instead, he has ongoing production y2 and a loan contract with bank-2.
In the market, entrepreneur-i, for i = 0, 1, maximizies
Eai(1)x− E(ai(1)x)
2 + bi(1) (2.37)
subject to
(i)a0(1)p1 + b0(1) = 13p1 + 1, and
(ii)a1(1)p1 + b1(1) = 13p1 + (β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)) + 1)θ.
Entrepreneur-2 maximizes a different objective function:
E(a2(1)− β2(0)1D2)x−
1
γ
E(a2(1)− β2(0)1D2)
2x2
+b2(1) + q2θ(β2(0)v2(0, β1(0)) + 1)− q2β2(0)v2(0, β1(0)) (2.38)
subject to
(i)(a2(1)− β2(0))p1 + b2(1) = (13 − β2(0))p1, and
(ii)1
3
≥ a2(1) ≥ β2(0).
Entrepreneur-2 can only sell but not buy x for he has no cash.
Solving these problems yields the demand functions of x for all three en-
trepreneurs at time 1: a0(1)(p1) =
γ(1−p1)
2σ2
, a1(1)(p1) =
γ(1−p1)
2σ2
, and a2(1)(p1) =
γ(1−p1)
2σ2
+ β2(0)q2. Given any price p1, entrepreneur-2 is demanding more x
than the other two. Given that their initial positions of x are the same be-
fore the market opens, entrepreneur-2 must be a buyer, which is impossi-
ble because entrepreneur-2 doesn’t have cash. The market can only clear for
entrepreneur-0 and entrepreneur-1. The market price is then determined by
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a0(1)(p1)+a1(1)(p1) =
2
3
. Solve the market price to obtain p1 = 1− 23
σ2
γ
= p0. The
price is the same as time 0 after a good return of y1.
On the other hand, if entrepreneur-1 suffers a bad return and obtains nothing
from his production y1, he is left with 13 − β1(0) units of x without cash. He
defaults on his loan and the bank sells the collateral to the market, hoping to
fetch the price v1(0, β1(0)) = 1 − 23
σ2
γ
− β1(0)
σ2
γ
. This price is received as long
as the other two entrepreneurs, entrepreneur-2 and entrepreneur-0, are able to
buy. Since entrepreneur-2 at time 0 has already used his cash for production,
he is not able to purchase from the market. As a result, entrepreneur-0 will be
the only buyer. Moreover, the default of entrepreneur-1 is public information,
which also affects bank-2’s pricing model v2(1, β) on the collateral x. Recall that
the lending bank evaluates the collateral by assuming it can be sold to both
entrepreneurs: entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-0. Now that entrepreneur-1
defaults, bank-2 will update the pricing model at time 1 as v2(1, β2(0)) = 1 −
2
3
σ2
γ
− β2(0)
2σ2
γ
to reflect the fact that β2(0) units of x will be sold to a single
entrepreneur, entrepreneur-0. Entrepreneur-2 will get a margin call v2(0, β2(0))−
v2(1, β2(0)) from bank-2.
There’re two issues concerning entrepreneur-2’s response: his ability and his
willingness. We first find conditions on which entrepreneur-2 is able to satisfy
the marginal call. Assume now entrepreneur-2 needs to post additional β2(1)−
β2(0) units of x to the bank, where β2(1) ≤ 13 . The bank holds a total of β2(1) units
of x and values it as β2(1)v2(1, β2(1)) = β2(1)(1− 2σ
2
3γ
−β2(1)
2σ2
γ
). Setting this value
equal to the value of the loan, we have β2(0)v2(0, β2(0)) = β2(1)v2(1, β2(1)). Since
the right side is an increasing function from condition [2.3.3], entrepreneur-2
satisfies the marginal call if and only if β2(0)v2(0, β2(0)) ≤ 13v2(1,
1
3
), the maximal
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amount of loan backed by 1
3
unit of collateral. We formalize this as follows
Result 4 (Contagion) Entrepreneur-2 is able to satisfy the marginal call if and only if
β2(0)v2(0, β2(0)) ≤
1
3
v2(1,
1
3
), that is, β2(0)(1− 2σ
2
3γ
− β2(0)
σ2
γ
) < 1
3
(1− 4σ
2
3γ
).
Given entrepreneur-2’s ability, we now examine his two options: fulfilling
the bank’s collateral call or defaulting. To simplify the notation, we denote
by d the loan from the bank, such that d = β2(0)v2(0, β2(0)). If entrepreneur-
2 chooses to post additional collateral β2(1) − β2(0) (β2(1) is determined by
β2(1)v2(1, β2(1)) = d) to the bank, his time-2 expected utility is
U2 = E(1− β2(1)1D)x−
1
γ
E(1− β2(1)1D)
2x2 − q2[θ(1 + d)− d]. (2.39)
On the other hand, if he chooses to default voluntarily, his time-2 expected util-
ity is
U∗2 = E(1− β2(0))x−
1
γ
E(1− β2(0))
2x2 + q2[θ(1 + d)]. (2.40)
By calculation, we obtain U2−U∗2 =
σ2
γ
(2β2(0)
2−3(1−q2)β2(1)
2). Entrepreneur-2
will choose to default if and only if 2β2(0)2 − 3(1− q2)β2(1)2 < 0.
Result 5 Given entrepreneur-2’s ability to meet the margin call, he defaults if and only
if 2β2(0)2 − 3(1− q2)β2(1)2 < 0.
The situation for the price of x is worse if entrepreneur-2 is optimal to de-
fault, for both bank-1 and bank-2 are to sell x. We’ll show this worse scenario as
an example in this paper and assume the condition in proposition [5] holds.
Now according to the entrepreneur-0’s demand function a0(1)(p1) =
γ(1−p1)
2σ2
,
we have a0(1)(p1) = 13 + β1(0) + β2(0). Derive the price from the equation p1 =
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1− 2
3
σ2
γ
−(β1(0)+β2(0))
2σ2
γ
. Finally, we need to verify that at this price, it’s optimal
for both entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 not to sell. According to the two
entrepreneurs’ demand function a1(1)(p) =
γ(1−p)
2σ2
and a2(1)(p) =
γ(1−p)
2σ2
+q2β2(0),
they both want to purchase at such low price p1, but cannot, because they don’t
have cash. So the economy is in equilibrium with price p1.
To sum up, the price of x at time 1 depends on the outcome of y1, which is
illustrated below:


p1 = p0 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
, if y1 = r;
p1 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− (β1(0) + β2(0))
2σ2
γ
< p0, if y1 = 0.
(2.41)
At time 2
y2 realizes at time 2. All entrepreneurs now maximize the same objective func-
tion:
Eai(2)x−
1
γ
E(ai(2)x)
2 + bi(2) (2.42)
for i = 0, 1, 2, but with different wealth constraints depending on (y1, y2). This
same objective function implies the same demand function of x ai(2)(p2) =
γ(1−p2)
2σ2
for i ∈ N . We discuss all possible paths.
For path (y1, y2) = (0, 0)
For a path with two consecutive bad returns, the wealth constraint for
entrepreneur-0 is a0(2)p2 + b0(2) = (13 + β1(0) +β2(0))p2 + (1− (β1(0)+ β2(0))p1),
for entrepreneur-1 a1(2)p2 + b1(2) = (13 − β1(0))p2, and for entrepreneur-2
a2(2)p2 + b2(2) = (
1
3
− β2(0))p2. As argued before, the new equilibrium price
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is p2 = p1 = 1− 23
σ2
γ
− (β1(0)+β2(0))
σ2
γ
determined by entrepreneur-0’s demand
function. Both entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 want to purchase more x at
this low price but cannot do so because of their wealth constraints.
For path (y1, y2) = (0, r)
For a good return of y2, the wealth constraint for entrepreneur-0 is a0(2)p2 +
b0(2) = (
1
3
+β1(0)+β2(0))p2 +(1−(β1(0)+β2(0))p1), for entrepreneur-1 a1(2)p2 +
b1(2) = (
1
3
− β1(0))p2, and for entrepreneur-2 a2(2)p2 + b2(2) = (13 − β1(0))p2 +
(β2(0)v2(0, β1(0))+1)θ. Entrepreneur-2 and entrepreneur-0, unlike entrepreneur-
0, have no wealth constraints to purchase x. The market price p2 is determined
by a0(2)(p2) + a2(2)(p2) = 23 + β1(0). Solve the equation to obtain the price
p2 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− (β1(0))
σ2
γ
. At this price, entrepreneur-1 wants to buy but cannot
do so due to insufficient wealth. So, the economy is in equilibrium with price
p2 > p1.
For path (y1, y2) = (r, 0)
Entrepreneur-2 defaults at time 2 due to the bad outcome from production.
Bank-2 is now selling β2(0) units of x to the market. The wealth constraint for
entrepreneur-0 is a0(2)p2 + b0(2) = 13p2 + 1, for entrepreneur-1 a1(2)p2 + b1(2) =
1
3
p2 +(1+β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)))θ−β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)), and for entrepreneur-2 a2(2)p2 +
b2(2) = (
1
3
− β2(2))p2. The price p2 is determined by a0(2)(p2) + a1(2)(p2) =
2
3
+ β2(0). Solve the equation to obtain the price p2 = 1− 23
σ2
γ
− β2(0)
σ2
γ
. Again,
we can verify that at this price entrepreneur-2 is willing to buy but cannot do so
due to the wealth constraint. So the market is in equilibrium at price p2 < p1.
It should be noted that bank-2 sold x at its model price p2 = v2(0, β1(0)), so it
doesn’t suffer any losses.
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For path (y1, y2) = (r, r)
This is the best economy of the four paths. Entrepreneur-2 is able to repay
the loan and redeem the collateral. The wealth constraint for entrepreneur-0
is a0(2)p2 + b0(2) = 13p2 + 1, for entrepreneur-1 a1(2)p2 + b1(2) =
1
3
p2 + (1 +
β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)))θ − β1(0)v1(0, β1(0)), and for entrepreneur-2 a2(2)p2 + b2(2) =
1
3
p2 + (1 + β2(0)v2(0, β1(0)))θ− β2(0)v2(0, β1(0)). All entrepreneurs have enough
cash and the price p2 is determined by a0(2)(p2)+a1(2)(p2)+a2(2)(p2) = 1. Solve
the equation to obtain the price p2 = 1− 23
σ2
γ
.
The price paths are summarized as follows:
if (y1, y2) = (0, 0), p0 > p1 = p2 (2.43)
if (y1, y2) = (0, r), p0 > p1 < p2 (2.44)
if (y1, y2) = (r, 0), p0 = p1 > p2 (2.45)
if (y1, y2) = (r, r), p0 = p1 = p2. (2.46)
2.4.2 The Price Evolution for x in the Market Economy
In this section, entrepreneurs only rely on the market to finance their produc-
tion. Specifically, entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 sell x at time 0 to raise
cash. As we argued before, the entrepreneur with the less profitable produc-
tion technology may end up buying x. To make matters simple, we can think of
both entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2 as having similar productions so that
both are selling x in equilibrium. Finally, we add a superscript ′ to all notations
regarding the market economy to be distinguished from the previous banking
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economy.
In the market equilibrium at time 0, we denote by β ′1(0) and β ′2(0) the amount
of x sold by entrepreneur-1 and entrepreneur-2, respectively. The equilibrium
price is then p′0 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
−(β ′1(0)+β
′
2(0))
2σ2
γ
. This is the price for entrepreneur-0
to hold 1
3
+β ′1(0)+β
′
2(0) units of x according to his demand function a′0(0)(p′0) =
γ(1−p′0)
2σ2
.
A similar argument gives the price paths of x for the three periods. The result
is summarized as:
p′0 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− (β ′1(0) + β
′
2(0))
2σ2
γ
(2.47)
p′1 = p
′
0, p
′
2 = p
′
1, if (y1, y2) = (0, 0) (2.48)
p′1 = p
′
0, p
′
2 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− β ′1(0)
σ2
γ
, if (y1, y2) = (0, r) (2.49)
p′1 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− β ′2(0)
σ2
γ
, p′2 = p
′
1, if (y1, y2) = (r, 0) (2.50)
p′1 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
− β ′2(0)
σ2
γ
, p′2 = 1−
2
3
σ2
γ
, if (y1, y2) = (r, r). (2.51)
2.4.3 The Comparison
Figure 2.5-2.8 illustrates the comparisons.
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Figure 2.5: The price path of x in the economy with two bad returns (y1 =
y2 = 0)
Figure 2.6: The price path of x in the economy with bad return preceding
good return (y1 = 0, y2 = r)
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Figure 2.7: The price path of x in the economy with good return preceding
bad return (y1 = r, y2 = 0)
Figure 2.8: The price path of x in the economy with both good returns
(y1 = r, y2 = r)
The timing of the lowest price in the market economy is in the very begin-
ning when entrepreneurs are selling x to raise cash. The price then reflects the
entrepreneurs’ opportunity cost in addition to the risk of x. In the banking econ-
omy, the price at the beginning is artificially high, reflecting the risk of x only.
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Both of these observations can be seen from the time 1 price equations: in the
market economy p0 =
3−2 σ
2
γ
r3+q1θr2+q2θr
and in the banking economy p0 = 1 − 2σ
2
3γ
.
The inflated price can be deflated by a default of one entrepreneur at time 1
when all banks realize that their models are invalid. Without being able to se-
cure more collateral, all banks liquidate the collateral in the market–dumping
to a single buyer, entrepreneur-0–driving the price to the bottom. Considering
that entrepreneur-2 still has an on going production that allows him to possibly
repay the loan upon maturity, it’s advisable for bank-2 to wait. But the waiting
only makes sense under a book cost accounting rule, which permits banks to
record losses later. Mark-to-market accounting rule doesn’t favor waiting.
2.4.4 Summary
With the multi-period model, we are able to examine the entrepreneurs’ default
and the banks’ liquidation in detail. First, by using the same asset x as collateral,
the entrepreneurs’ balance sheets are tied together. Meanwhile, each bank’s val-
uation on collateral is subject to the aggregate buying power of entrepreneurs.
For such a closely linked web, even if there’s one entrepreneur that defaults, all
entrepreneurs may end up defaulting. This is because banks, observing a single
default, need to reevaluate the collateral, sending margin calls to their borrow-
ers. When some of the borrowers cannot satisfy the margin call, the collateral
value goes down further, which forces banks to request more collateral. The vi-
cious cycle could ultimately bankrupt all entrepreneurs. To illustrate the above
effects, we assumed two things in the model. First is that there’s no haircut for
the collateral so that borrowers are vulnerable to a small change of collateral
value. Second is that there’s no liquidity for the borrowers’ production, in that
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it cannot be sold to satisfy margin call before maturity.
2.5 Conclusion
We have built a model by adding banks to a general equilibrium setting and
have shown that banks attract all entrepreneurs in need of financing. Extending
the framework to a multi-period model, we explore the characteristics of the
collateral’s price. Because banks are able to lure away from the market all en-
trepreneurs that are searching for funds for production, the market price stays
high in the beginning under no selling pressure. But this high price is an illu-
sion, for banks cannot remove the low asset price, rather, they merely postpone
it. The asset price will eventually be in line with the aggregate wealth in the
economy.
The model used in the paper is the first step to research how collateral bor-
rowing affects entrepreneurs and hence the economy in general. A more general
model should include the hair cut or lending rates that are higher than the mar-
ket free rate. After imposing the two, bank loan financing will look less attrac-
tive, and there might exist an equilibrium where entrepreneurs are indifferent
between borrowing from banks and selling the asset in the market. Another
important direction is to allow banks to base their loans not just on a single
market price but also on the trading volume. After all, when banks model the
value of the collateral, they’re looking for the demand curve. A single price is
insufficient to determine a curve.
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